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5ABSTRACT
       Most of economists, who prefer either the classical trade theory or the
latest emerging new trade theory, adhere to the doctrine of free trade.
However, the perplexity between the theoretical ideology and ever-lasting
protectionism in reality demonstrates that the political decision-making process
of trade policy is often less understood or even ignored.  Political economy of
trade policy, or simply called endogenous tariff theory, may offer a plausible and
decent answer to the dilemma from the perspective of income distribution,
rather than economic efficiency.
       The paper is basically an analytical-cum-empirical study of trade politics in
China, P. R. on the basis of the latest theoretical development of political
economy of trade. For this purpose, Chinese trade policies, including trade
development strategy, export and import regime, and trade liberalization reform
are thoroughly examined so as to yield a comprehensive and far-reaching
insight into the political economy of trade policy in China.  In Particular, the
pattern of trade protection in industrial sectors is studied by cross-sector and
time series data to explain its political and economic determinants. Instead of
figuring out an optimal trade strategy and reform package for the government,
the aim of the study attempts to present a profound understanding to the
distorted trade regime and piecemeal trade liberalization process of China, the
country never exploited in previous literatures but significantly impacting world
trade.
       The paper is arranged in five sections.  In Section I, the research
background, motif, methodology and structure of study are deliberately
elaborated.  Section II describes an analytical framework of the trade policy
decision-making process in China, and then reviews motives, behaviors and
performance of main playing roles, namely, the party and central government,
domestic interest groups, external pressures of world trade system and foreign
governments.  A formal revised model of political economy of trade protection,
which seems fit to Chinese prevailing political institution, is developed in Section
III, and then used as a calibration to produce regression models to estimate
determination of industrial trade protection structure in Section IV.  Meanwhile,
a data bank with the uniform classification standard is established to constitute
empirical samples.  Finally, in Scetion V I summarize main conclusions of the
study.
        The general conclusions of the paper are as follows:
        (1) Due to the institutional features of market-preserved authoritarianism
and state activism, the party ideology, government preference and national
interests are the most crucial factors influencing the decision-making of trade
policy in China.  Specifically, trade planning, trade flow controlling, export
promotion and import substitution, industrial policy, national economic security
6and balance of payment are concrete objectives to be pursued. The protection
policies of trading rights, automatic import registration, automobile production,
grain import and banking service are those typical cases.
        (2)Thanks to the gradual political democratization and fast economic
growth, more diversified social interests become virtually legitimate and active
in a corporatism state, consequently leading to their increasing lobbying and
rent-seeking activities for import protection and export preferential policies.
Bureaucracy in central executive bodies and local governments, favored in a
“clientelism” network culture, appear to be a dominated interest group, while
others, mainly composed of domestic enterprises of various kinds, foreign
investors, military, and consumers, however only have a marginal or diminishing
impact on the decision-making.  Such an argument can be demonstrated by
case studies on, for example, the policies for protecting telecommunication
sector, import quota and licensing requirement, export quota bidding, foreign
exchange retention and multiple exchange rates system, antidumping
enforcement and anti-smuggling campaign.
       (3) With the integration into the world economy, Chinese authority can no
longer make final decisions by neglecting the world trade institutional settings
and international collective actions as before.  The prevailing diplomatic strategy
and trade philosophy of foreign governments as well as commercial interest of
multinational corporations will impose a more significant external pressure on
China to ratchet up her trade liberalization in the context of multilateralism
(GATT/WTO), regionalism (APEC) and bilateralism (mainly with the United
States). On the other hand, in the long run, China will benefit herself from
bargain-induced trade reform by fully integrating into a market-oriented and
rules-based world economy.
       (4) The trade protection rates (nominal tariff, non-tariff barriers, and
effective protection rate) are not only relatively high but quite dispersed as well
among 36 Chinese industry sectors, which reflects both national strategic
activism and different lobbying capacity of interest groups. The empirical study
indicates that those sectors which have the characteristics of higher labor
productivity, higher comparative advantage, higher backward linkage, higher
labor intensity, higher profits and tax creating, lower value added proportion of
public enterprises, and higher consumer goods ratio are usually able to obtain
higher nominal and effective protection.  Additionally, there is a complementary
relation between tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  The result of regressions shows
that “social concern model” in the literature seems to be more appropriate to
explain China’s trade protection pattern than “self-interest model”.
Nevertheless, the social concern herein primarily deals with implementing
national interests and industrial policy, rather than mitigating structural
adjustment cost and pursuing the equality of income distribution.
       As regards policy implications, the study argues that if trade liberalization
reform could be viable in the future in China, leaders in the party and central
government have to adopt innovative market-oriented trade philosophy and
succeed in dismantling obstructions from some interest groups by restructuring
political bargain and consensus process in policy-making.  Commitments to
internatinal agreements and institutional rules in world trade system can provide
China with a benchmark and “bicycle effect” for pending reforms.
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I.     Introduction
        Most of economists, who prefer either to the classical trade theory or to the
latest emerging new trade theory1, adhere to the doctrine of free trade.
However, the perplexity between the theoretical ideology and ever-lasting
protectionism in reality had puzzled them for a long time.  It essentially
originates from the traditional viewpoint dimension in which economists study
on trade policy, namely, the efficiency property of trade policy (Helpman, 1995).
It means that if a government pursues economic efficiency or social welfare
maximization, all trade policy instruments, whether they be tariffs, export
subsidies, quota and lisence requirements or voluntary export restraints, should
be eliminated.  Or in other words, if there exit some trade policy measures, they
destine to result in economic distortions and welfare losses under most
circumstances.
        One plausible answer to the dilemma is the theory of political economy of
trade policy that has produced a strand of literature to explain the existence of
prevailing trade policy since the late 1970s.  Instead of economic efficiency, the
theory stresses on income distributional consideration and argues that the
political decision-making process of trade policy is often less understood or
even ignored.  It contends that the real reason for trade interventions is that
they are subjectively ”created” (supplied) or objectively "needed" (demanded)
by the government or some interest groups in society.  Given the government
objective function and prevailing social interest structure, trade policy should be
viewed as a device for income transfers to preferred groups.  In other owrds, it
is a sort of “equilibrium price” solved in the political market with the participation
of public, authority, interest groups, and foreigners. Therefore, the political
economy of trade policy can be simplified as “endogenous tariff theory”, in
contrast to the traditional theory which looks upon tariff as ”exogenous” decided.
        On the basis of Mueller’s pioneering work on the relation between trade
policy and public choice theory, a large number of literatures have emerged in
this field (Baldwin, 1982).  Early formalizations (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1971,
1982) emphasized the social welfare loss of endogenous formulation of trade
policy by developing the well-known rent-seeking theory, directly unproductive
profit-seeking (DUP) theory, and generalized distortion theory, which now
constitute the theory of "normative political economy of trade policy" (Baldwin,
1996).  More recently, many researchers have concentrated on formally
modelling the institutional features of the policy formation process by
                                                                
1 Since late 1970s, a group of trade economists challenged the theoretical orthodoxy by developing so-
called “new trade theory” and then agitating “strategic trade policy”.  A beggar-thy-neighbor policy
including export subsidies and tariffs is advocated to extract rent from foreigners on the premise of
imperfect competition market structure and increasing returns.  Externality is another argument to support
governmental border intervention to promote the development in high-tech industries.  Although such an
aggressive policy is welcomed by the business field and some patriotism politicians, it is still in the acute
debate within the academic scope.   Many critics argued that new trade theory does not present a strong
ground of tracking off free trade.
8considering governments, political parties, lobbyists, and elections.  These
models contribute to enriching the theory of  "positive political economy of trade
policy" (Baldwin, 1996).  As a branch, models of "social corcern approach" view
the government as a benign shepherd to maximize the ”conservative social
welfare function” (Corden, 1974) or provide insurance in case of import
competition (Eaton and Grossman, 1985; Cassing, Hillman, and Long, 1986;
Staiger and Tabellini, 1987).  "Self-interest approach" is another branch to
relate trade policy to domestic and international politics, given the nature of the
government as an “economic man” in pursuit of rationality and selfishness.
However, there does not exit a coherent theory to explain trade policy due to
the disagreed theory of politics.  In specific, Mayer (1984) proposed to regard
trade policy as the outcome of majority voting over tariff levels in a direct
democracy.  Peltzman and Stigler (1971) and Hillman (1982)  argued that a
tariff rate can be seen the solution of government’s trading off political support
from interest groups.  In the Findley-Wellisz model (1982), a tariff results from
non-cooperative game between the interest group lobbying for it and the other
opposing it.  Alternatively, Magee, Brock and Young (1989) emphasized on the
electoral competition between two political parties and therefore tariffs are the
Nash equilibrium of a two-stage game among parties, interest groups and
public.  They also revealed an extreme case called  “black hole effect” that
almost all of social resources will be exhausted to lobby for a favoured trade
policy while tariff rate is finally reduced.  Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982) used a
tariff formation function with a government that cares about the welfare of
general public, and eventually the trade protection demanded by an organized
interest group can be lowered to an “efficient" tariff rate than initially seeked by
”bribery”.  Finally, a prominent model in the recent political economy literature
on trade policy is Grossman and Helpman's (1994) "Proection for Sale" model,
which highlights the influence exerted by interest groups on policy makers by
means of political contributions. Tariffs are induced in the model to maximize
the joint objective function of the government and organized interest groups.
With a relatively simple structure, the model yields a clear-cut theoretical
prediction that have strong implications for the cross-sector pattern of trade
protection.  Despite the difference of political institutions and lobbying channels
that models rely on, Rodrik (1995) pointed out their similarity in terms of
modelling structure and Helpman (1995) presented them in a unified framework
that helped to see the key parallel solution in tariff formulas among them.  Other
literature survey can be referred to the works of Nelson (1988), Hillman (1989),
Baldwin (1996), and Pant (1997).
        In addition to the theroretical development, there are a vast number of
empirical studies that investigate the political-economy determinants of trade
protection.  Among others, a few eminent examples are Caves(1976), Marvel
and Ray (1983), Lavergne (1983), Trefler (1993), and Goldberg and Maggi
(1997) to study the protection pattern of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Other
econometric studies are applied to the analysis of voting poll on trade acts in
congress (Baldwin, 1976; Baldwin and Magee, 1998) or decision on
administrative protection, e.g. anti-dumping and countervailing duties in trade
commissions (Finger, Hall and Nelson, 1982).  Baldwin (1984) and Rodrik
(1995) did a marvellous comprehensive survey of literature reviews in these
9aspects.   Furthermore, case studies of some sensitive agricutural and industrial
sectors, like NBER projects (Krueger, 1996), are also conducted to deepen the
understanding to the political economy of trade policy in a non-technical
method.  Most empirical studies deal with developed countries, especially with
U.S., and some have emerged in recent years for developing countries, such as
South Korean (Yoo, 1993), Taiwan (Chen and Hou, 1993), and Mexico
(Grether, Melo, and Olarreaga, 1999).
        Unfortunately, so far there is few study on the political economy of trade
policy in the transitional economies.  In particular, the research on China, the
largest developing country and emerging market in world trade, is still in blank.
Unlike the political system of check and balance in western democracy,
centralism and authoritarianism still dominate the contemporary Chinese politics
in general.  However, there also appear some unique traditional charateristics of
cultural legacy and new features brought by the reform, such as trends in
authority changing from "individual pluralism" into "institutional pluralism" and
from personal dictatorship to oligarchical consensus-building, "communist
neotraditionalism" shifting from totalitarian mass mobilization to network-based
clientelism, "fragmented authoritarianism" shifting from bureaucratic central
command through the planning apparatus to interunit bargaining in governance,
and "state corporatism" that party-state grants interest-licensing allowing
constituent units to organize a limited number of hierarchically ordered and
functionally differentiated associations to articulate their interests (Hamrin and
Zhao, 1995).  From the economic perspective, China seems to emphasize more
on exercising  comprehensive consensus and moderate authority while trying to
preserve the market mechanism by means of institutional incentives and
survelliance-coordination system, which can be precisely called “market-
preserving authoritarianism” or “market-preserving federalism” (Li and Lian,
1996).  These new political and economic configurations make the
understanding of Chinese decision-making process more complicated than
expected and consequently enrich elements of analyzing the political economy
of trade policy in China.   In addition, as Shirk (1993) argued, the practical
challenge of reforming a communist economy is how to manage politically the
major redistributions of funds and power involved in the transition from central
planning to market competition.  Therefore, the process of economic reform in
China should be better observed and understood in terms of political logic.  The
study on the political economy of trade policy  can be accordingly regarded as a
case of such an analysis.
       Under such a background, the paper attempts to conduct an analytical and
empirical study of trade politics in China based on the latest development of
political economy of trade policy. Instead of figuring out an optimal trade
strategy and reform package for the government, the aim of the study is to
present a profound understanding to the distorted trade regime and piecemeal
trade liberalization process of China.  For this purpose, Chinese trade and
industrial policies, including trade development strategy, export and import
regime, and trade liberalization reform, are thoroughly examined so as to yield a
comprehensive and far-reaching insight into the decision-making of trade policy
in China.  The paper argues that Chinese trade policy formation is still
dominated by party-state leaders' ideological preference and great concern
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about national interests. On the other hand, the growth of bureaucratic
compartmentalization both in central and local levels and business influence in
domestic are eroding the unchallenged authoritarianism of making trade policy.
More significantly, external forces, the negotiation on China’s accesstion to
WTO in peculiar, are ratcheting up trade liberalization process in China.  The
commitments to multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements also
present Chinese leading reformists with a political vehicle to win over interest
groups who will block radical market-oriented reform in the future.  The cross-
sector and time series empirical study which explains political and economic
determinants on the pattern of trade protection in Chinese industrial sectors
supports, to a large degree, such arguments presented in the paper.
       The following part is arranged for four sections.  Section II describes an
analytical framework of the decision-making process of trade policy in China,
and reviews motives, behaviors and performance of main playing roles, namely,
the party and central government, domestic interest groups, external pressures
of world trade system and foreign governments. In Section III,  a formal revised
model of political economy of trade protection, which seems fit to Chinese
political institution, is developed and then used as a calibration to produce
regression models to estimate the determination of industrial trade protection
structure in Section IV.  Meanwhile, a data bank with a uniform classification
standard is established to constitute empirical samples. Finally, Scetion V
concludes.
II.   The Decision-making Process of Trade Policy in China
       Diagram 1 depicts an analytical framework of  the decision-making process
of trade policy in China.  The central government, de facto  controlled by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dominates in the decision-making of
economic policy with its traditional ideology, principles and doctrines developed
during past five decades, namely, "balancing in aggregate", "structural
adjustment" and "macroeconomic alignment". As far as trade policy is
concerned, the “policy targets” inherent in political leaders and techno
bureaucracy are specified as trade plan, trade flow control, trade developemnt
strategy, industrial policy, economic security, and balance of payment.  On the
other hand, though not officially recognized and institutionally legitimated,
interest groups have become more active since the economic reform.  Notably,
central administrative ministries and local governments are special kinds of
pressure groups in China due to their significant status in the delegated
bureaucratic hierarchy.  They usually play the role of an agent to lobby or seek
rent for their principals, like state-owned enterprises, foreign-funded enterprises,
and military,  who are affiliated to governmental entities in various forms and
bargain with the designated authority in an informal, nontransparent and
behind-the-sence style. Subject to the one-party democracy and legacy of
economic planning, interest groups, however, only have marginal impacts on
the decision-making of trade policy in general1.   Finally, with the integration into
                                                                
1 Nevertheless, some commentators argued that if considering the feedback process of policy
implementation, domestic interest groups may be able to virtually change the central government’s policy
under some circumstances.   Indeed, there are many examples to illustrate that local governments were
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the world economy, China is confronted with more and more demanding
challenges of foreign interests, including the rules-based and institutionalized
world trade system, international and regional collective actions, and bilateral
policy co-ordination in negotiation. The traditional mode of closed decision-
making is no longer apt to China under the current circumstance of globalization
and regionalization.  Basically, diplomatic strategy of foreign governments, trade
politics of parties, commercial interest of multinational corporations and public
opinion will exert a profound impact on China's policy-making process in three
dimensions, namely, China’s accession to GATT/WTO, regional trade
liberalization arrangement (like APEC), and bilateral trade frictions and talks,
particularly with the United States.  In what follows, I will elaborate on
governmental preference of formulating trade policy, as well as internal and
external interest groups' influence on the decision-making process.
Diagram 1.    The Decision-making Process of Trade Policy in China:
An Analytical Framework
                                                                    Central Administrative                     Trade Plan
                                                                            Ministries
                                     Local Governmants                                                        Trade Flow Control
                    Domestic Enterprises                                                                     Trade Development Strategy
                                                                                Party
     Foreign-Funded Enterprises                                  &                                     Industrial Policy
                                                                                State
                            Military                                                                                   Economic Secruity
                                               Consumers                                                            Balance of Payment
                                                           Foreign Governments                        Non-economic Objectives
                                                           & World Trade System
           
       Government Preference and National Interests
       Trade Development Plan
       Independence and self-reliance are fundamental principles for making
economic development policy in China.  In the planned autarky economy,
foreign trade could only have a function of balancing the gap between
mandatory production and consumption in the fixed price system and must be
incorporated into the short, medium and long-term national economic and social
development plans or guidelines.  Domestic market was isolated from
                                                                                                                                                                                             
sometimes indifferent to orders or circumvent regulations imposed by the central authority.
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international market by national trade monopoly and canalization. Exports were
considered politically and economically in priority because of long suffering from
the shortage of foreign exchanges.  Import substitution was encouraged through
industrial and trade policies in order to increase the local content of all key
manufactured products, capital goods and consumer products in particular.
        The picture has been changed since the reform in 1979.  Foreign trade
based on comparative advantage has been growing at the spectacular rate.  It
is much attributed to the export promotion of labour-intensive products of which
China has abandunt resource endowment.  However, imports are still
formidably limited through a variety of means.  Radical trade liberalization
reform, in which trade mandatory plan and trade restrictive barriers were
reduced to certain degree, only begun in 1992 right after the Chinese
Communist Party announced to establish the so-called “Socialism Market
Economic System”.
       The contemporary national trade development program is still a typical way
of “state activism” in China.  It consists of directives on volume control and
structural adjustment.  In the Five-year National plan of Economic and Social
development and Ten-year National Long-term Target Outlines, the volumes of
export and import as well as annual growth rates are specified in concrete
number, though they are now only viewed as guided indicators rather than
mandatory ones as before. The ultimate goal of volume control is to accelerate
economic development because foreign trade has a significantly contribution to
GDP growth.  Furthermore, the central government succeeds in adjusting trade
structure by implementing differential trade policies among sectors.  For
exports, more preferential treatments have been given to the production of
manufactured goods with higher value added ratio, particularly to mechanical
and electronic equipment, in order to upgrade quality and increase
technological content.  Primary goods, mainly including minerals and fuels, are
often subject to export restriction to ensure sufficient supply for domestic market
and avoid the phenomenon of “immiserizing growth” occurred in other
developing countries.  On the import side, high-tech software, equipment and
key components, as well as raw materials and intermediate products in great
shortage are allowed to import in priority by tariff exemption or preference, while
imports of general production means, assemble lines, and durable consumer
goods are strictly controlled through prohibitive tariffs and quantitive measures.
Therefore, it is no surprise to find that China’s export commodity pattern has
changed much faster than that of import.
       Trade Flow Control
       Trade flow control policies, primarily composed of (i) trading rights, (ii)
tariffs, non-tariff measures, export tax and license, and (iii) foreign exchange
control (discussed in "balance of payment"), are used to implement mandatory
or guided trade plans.
       Trading Rights
       Trading rights system defines types and numbers of commercial entities
which have the legal right within China to engage in international trade as well
as kinds of commodities they can deal in.  The aim is said to “maintain the
13
uniformity of trade regime” and “keep foreign trade in order”. All trade were
canalized through 10-16 state specialized trade companies which were
responsible for implementing the central plan before 1978 (Lardy, 1992).
Although trading rights have been decentralized since the reform, the goods
that are of great commercial value to both China and trading partners are still
exported or imported principally through central or local state-owned trade
companies and enterprises, which account for about 60 percentage in total
trade (Diagram 2).   By means of approving or abolishing trading rights like
adjusting “valves”, the central government is easily capable of controlling trade
flows.  In addition, trading rights can also be authorised to companies in priority
sectors or regions on the preferential basis in order to change export and import
structures.  According to the Law of Foreign Investment, all foreign-funded
companies will automatically be given trading rights when registered.
Diagrame 2.  Foreign Trade Pattern by Ownership in China (1995-97)
                   Source: Custom Office, Chinese Custom Satistics, 1995, 1996, 1997
         In  1997, China has pledged in the trade negotiation of accession to WTO
that restriction of trading rights will be completely eliminated and foreigners are
allowed to access to China’s internal distribution system over a three-year
period.  At the end of the transition period, all domestic and foreign companies
and enterprises will automatically have trading rights as soon as they register.
Nevertheless, the U.S. demand that foreign companies deal directly with
Chinese customers or end-users by retail or wholesale instead of being forced
to go through intermediary trade companies was denied by the Chinese
authority.
       In addition, China’s current restrictive approach to license the scope of a
business’s operations ––– defining and limiting the types of goods a company
can deal in as well as operations in which it may engage in China ––– may
prove to be a harbinger of restraint on the future expanded trading rights
system.  According to the revised regime in 1993, import commodities are now
divided into four categories subject to the scope license. National trade
monopoly and canalization in particular apply to some essential agricultural and
industrial products, such as grain, crude oil, fertiliser, cotton, tobacco and
cigarettes.
       Tariffs and other trade tax
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       As shown in Table 1, until the mid-1990s, China's tariffs were often high
enough to preclude most imports.  After successive tariff reductions from 1994
to 1998, China has lowered its average import tariff rate to 17 percent and
announced to further reduce it to 15 percent in 2000 and 10 percent in 20051.
However, the disparity among tariffs still remains large, shown by the standard
deviation rates in Table 1.  For instance, the tariff rates of sectors in which
China is seeking to build her international competitiveness, such as chemicals
and motor vehicles, remain extremely high ––– even to be prohibitive tariffs.  On
the other hand, the average nominal tariff rate dramatically differs from duty-
collected rate because the authority grants preferential tariff rates to some
imports, for example, high-technology equipment by special exemptions.
Hence, the actual restrictiveness of tariff regime is lessened to a considerable
extent.  Finally, since 1996, in addition to tariffs, all imports have also been
levied on value-added tax (13% or 17%) and part of them are taxed on
consumption tax (3-5%).
                                 Table  1.      Tariff Rates and Tariff Structure of China (%)
 All products Primary products Manufactured products Collected
tariff rates Unweithed
Mean
tariffs
Standard
deviation
rates
Weighted
mean
tariffs
Unweithed
Mean
tariffs
Standard
deviation
rates
Weighted
mean
tariffs
Unweithed
Mean
tariffs
Standard
deviation
rates
Weighted
mean
tariffs
1992 4.9 42.9 32.1 40.6 36.2 26.2 22.3 44.9 33.4 46.5
1993 4.3 39.9 29.9 38.4 33.3 24.7 20.9 41.8 31.0 44.0
1994 2.9 36.3 27.9 35.5 32.1 24.3 19.6 37.6 28.8 40.6
1995 2.7 35.6 - 25.0 - - - - - -
1996 3.0 23.9 17.6 25.4 25.1 22.1 19.4 23.6 16.0 27.6
1997 2.7 17.6 13.0 18.2 17.9 18.1 20.0 17.5 11.0 17.8
1998 - 17.5 13.0 18.7 17.9 18.6 20.0 17.4 10.8 18.5
Note: Collected tariff rates are ratios of tariff revenue to total imports.  Weighted mean tariff is the average
of applied rates weighed by product shares in 1995 world imports.
Source: Collected tariff rates estimated from Chinese Statistics Bureau, Chinese Statistical Yearbook ,
1998; others from World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999, CD-ROM
        Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
        Import quota and licensing requirements are core measures of NTBs in
China and they, however, have been reduced significantly in the recent trade
liberalization reform. The coverage ratio, the index that the value of imports
subject to core NTBs accounts for total imports, has lowered from 35% in 1992
to 15% in 1996 and then to 5% in 19982.   As shown in Table 2, the
commodities still under quantitive restriction include some agricultural products,
raw materials, food products, textiles, machinery and equipment, transportation
equipment, and heavy industrial products. The restrictions are sometimes
overlapped with trading rights (state monopoly and canalization) mentioned
above to strengthen import control.
       In spite of welcomed removal of trading rights and quotas and license
requirements, there are indications that China is trying to erect some new trade
                                                                
1 China's Individual Action Plan on Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation in APEC, Version
3, 1999, APEC Secretariat, Singapore.
2 IMF, Economic Reform in China: A New Phase, IMF Occasional Paper 114; World Bank, Chinese
Economy: Fighting Inflation and Deepening Reform , Country Report; China's Individual Action Plan on
Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation in APEC, Version 3, 1999, APEC Secretariat,
Singapore.
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barriers to restrict imports. These measures include the new “automatic” import
registration requirement, electronic and mechanical product import control
measures, new regulations on the administration of medical equipment,
pharmaceutical price control regulations, and “buy local” campaign on
telecommunications equipment and components. Such measures can be
regarded as government plots to avert or minimize the risk in trade
liberalization.  Some of these measures appear to pose a new de facto  licensing
requirement.  Take iron and steel as an example, the automatic registration
requirement was carried out at the beginning of 1994 and importers must
demonstrate a market need for the goods and prove that they could pay for
them.  In practice, the import, however, was not "automatically" approved, but
rather depended on authority's discretionary criteria and implicit motive of
maintaining trade protection that attempted to substitute the original import
quota and licence requirement which had been abolished according to Sino-
U.S. Market Access Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1992.  As
a result, the import of iron and steel dropped dramatically in 1994.
Table 2.  China’s Non-tariff Barriers for Main Import Commodities (1996)
State
monopoly
Canalization London
Chemical
Convention
Import license Import
quota
Price tender Total
Rice 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Wheat 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Corn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nongrain crops 50.0 22.9 0.0 72.9 72.9 0.0 0.0
Livestock 0.0 72.7 0.0 72.7 72.7 0.0 72.7
Meat and Milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other food
products
37.2 0.0 0.0 32.9 31.7 0.0 38.4
Natural resource 46.6 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0. 59.5
Textiles 0.3 5.7 0.0 12.7 12.7 0.0 12.7
Apparel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Light manufatures 0.0 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.3
Transport
industries
0.0 0.0 0.0 35.8 35.8 6.6 42.4
Machinery and
equipment
0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 9.2 20.4 26.4
Basic heavy
manufactures
18.7 16.2 0.3 23.5 22.7 0.0 37.7
Service 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 11.0 7.3 0.1 18.5 16.3 7.4 32.5
Note: Non-tariff barriers are calculated by coverage ratio of imports.
Source: World Bank (1997)
       Trade Development Strategy
       Trade development strategy is the policy to stimulate production and trade
of some sectors by changing the relative price of exportable and importable
goods.  By the "multi-indicator method" developed by the World Bank (1987),
China’s trade development strategy, as Diagram 3 shows, is described as four
phases from 1980 to 1998, i.e.  “import substitution and marginal export
promotion” (1980-983), “export promotion neutralizing import substitution”
(1984-1990), “export promotion and marginal trade liberalization”(1991-1993),
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and “trade liberalization” (1994-now).  They reveal the central government's
strategy of trade and industrial policies for the economic reform.
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Diagram 3.     China’s Trade Development Strategies
1980      1981      1982      1983      1984      1985      1986      1987      1988      1989      1990      1991      1992      1993      1994      1995      1996       1997      1998
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Tariff
                                                                                                                                                       Tariff reduction                           Tariff reduction
                                                            Import adjusted tariff                                                          Eliminating import adjusted tariff
                                                                                                                                                                                                      Import  value-added  tax and  excise tax
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Non-tariff barriers        
                                                         Restoring import license                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                         Reducing                          import                                licenses
                                                                                                                                                                         Eliminating import substitution list
                                                                                                                                                                         Reducing                          import                                    plans
                                                                                                                                                                         Reducing                          import                                   quotas
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Import subsidy
Import subsidy                                                                                       Reducing import subidy                                                   Eliminating import subsidy
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Export Promotion
Special Economic Zones            Export process zones
                                                                 Starting Export tax rebate              Deepening reform                                                       Lowering rebate rates
   Trial on foreign
 exchange retention        Unified foreign exchange retention system     Multiple retention system      Streamlining system          Eliminating retention system
Export subsidy                                                                                                                         Eliminating export subsidy
                                                                                                        Increasing export credit                                      Establishing export and import bank
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Export control                           Restoring export licenses                                                             Strengthening export management
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Foreign exchanges and exchange rate
                                                                               Large depreciation                      Large depreciation                                      Large depreciation
Multiple foreign exchange rates                                                                                                                                                     Uniform and managed floating rate system
                                                                                                                                                                                                       Conditional liberalization   Liberalization
                                                                                                                                                                                                       of current account          of current account
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Source: Author’s compilation
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        Stage I: Import Substitution and Marginal Export Promotion (1980-1983)
        China had followed the former Soviet Unions’ style in industrialization since
1949 and import substitution had been a longstanding key element in Chinese
trade policy until the early 1990s. The traditional import substitution policy
differed from the way of other East Asian countries.  Stressing on the
development of heavy industries, China carried out import substitution through
“forward-linkage” that the indistrialization was initially fostered from down-
stream sectors in which China had the least comparative advantages in order to
supply capital equipment and intermediate goods for other sectors. On the
contrary, the countries in Asian neighbourhood pursued the “backward-
linkaged” industrialization, starting from labour-intensive sectors by producing
and exporting nondurable consumer goods in which their factors were most
richly endowed, and then gradually inducing demands from capital and
technology intensive sectors.  The wrong strategy China followed for nearly
three decades led to high cost of economic inefficiency, bottleneck of essential
industrial intermediate goods, shortage of foreign exchanges and consumer
goods, and low average wage.
        The strategy was changed in 1980 due to the well-known economic reform
and open-door policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping.  Significantly, exports in
labour-intensive sectors, such as textiles, apparel and footwear, boomed once
producers could recognize and foresee the "right" relative price in the market.
Export incentive policies, however, still seemed to be marginal in terms of the
degree of offsetting import substitution.  Regional preferential policies, foreign
exchange retention system, and secondary foreign exchange market (FEACs,
Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centres) were only put into experimental basis.
        Stage II: Export Promotion Neutralizing Import Substitution (1984-1990)
        During the second phase, export promotion measures, mainly including the
export tax rebate, export subsidy, foreign exchange retention quota and multiple
exchange rates system, were formally established and gradually generalized in
national wide through the trade reform schemes launched in 1984 and 1988.
On the other hand, import trade barriers, quota and licensing requirements in
particular, remained high.  In addition, real exchange rate was overvalued about
32% in average owing to the hyperinflation in 1985 and 1988, and the
discrepancy between official rate and FEACs rate were increasing considerably
during the period from 1986 to 1990 (Table 3).  Import substitution strategy still
prevailed to some extent.  According to the three-sector model in trade theory,
we call the second stage as “export promotion neutralizing import substitution”
or “protected export promotion” that both exportable and importable sectors can
be fostered to expand at the expense of non-trade sectors1. However, the
overall trade orientation at the period was still bias to import substitution in the
economy.  The argument is strongly verified by the empirical study on the
source of economic growth for 12 main industries during the period from 1985
to 1990, which shows that most of sectors witnessed export promotion and
import substitution simultaneously2.
                                                                
1 The World Bank country report (1993b) points out that if considering the dual price system prevailing in
the mid of 1980s, China’s trade strategy was more likely to be the kind of “de facto import promotion”,
which was both anti-export-promotion and anti-import-substitution and resulted in import maximization and
export minimization.  It partly explains China's huge trade deficit in the mid of 1980s.
2 The methodology of disaggregating the source of economic growth is based on Chenery, Robinson and
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Table 3.   Nominal and Real Exchange Rates (US$/RMB) in China: 1980-1994
Official rate Adjusting rate Weighted
nominal rate
Real official rate Weighted real rate
1980 1.5 - 1.5 1.5 1.5
1981 1.7 - 1.7 1.82 1.82
1982 1.89 - 1.89 2.02 2.02
1983 1.98 - 1.98 2.10 2.10
1984 2.32 - 2.32 2.15 2.15
1985 2.94 - 2.94 2.76 2.76
1986 3.45 - 3.45 2.93 2.93
1987 3.72 5.47 4.46 2.98 3.57
1988 3.72 6.31 4.86 2.57 3.35
1989 3.77 6.24 4.94 2.34 3.06
1990 4.78 5.81 5.23 3.01 3.29
1991 5.32 5.85 5.74 3.25 3.50
1992 5.51 6.58 6.37 3.14 3.63
1993 5.76 8.41 7.87 2.82 3.86
1994 8.62 - 8.62 4.61 4.61
Notes: 1. Weighted nominal rate=r´ adjusting rate+(1-r) ´official rate, and r is retention ratio;
           2. Real official rate=official nominal rate´(US wholesale price index/Chinese consumer
price index), 1980=100;
           3. Weighted real rate=weighted nominal rate´(US wholesale price index/Chinese
consumer price index), 1980=100;
Sources: Official rates, adjusting rates, and weighted nominal rates from World Bank (1993b);
price indexes from IMF, Financial Statistics, 1980-1994,various issues
       Why did the authority take on such a dual incentive structure?  It is argued
by the paper that the special strategy deals with the political economy of
China’s economic reform in the mid of 1980s.  According to the "convergence
school" (Sachs and Woo, 1997), the strategy and perspective of China's
economic reform still looked ambiguous and uncertain at the monent.  Instead
of a reflection of a deliberate and desirable approach of political leadership, the
evolutionary, experimental and incremental reforms resulted primarily from lack
of consensus over the proper course among senior party leaders and of
compromise with some interest groups strongly against reforms.   The trade
development strategy in the way of “protected export promotion” can be seen as
a case evident to the situation.  Specifically, new interest groups of export were
promoted to grow and also produce spillover effect in the economy, while those
inefficient state-owned industrial sectors were still shield from the external
competition in the old regime of import substitution.  Only on such a condition
could economic and trade reforms be politically sustained, otherwise most of
public enterprises would go bankruptcy by import shock, the result of which
evidently intended to trigger ideological debate and risk in losing the popularity
of the reform.  Therefore, the dual incentive structure in trade development
strategy seemed more politically sustainable and economic viable than radical
trade import liberalization, albeit market distortion and corruption.
       Stage III: Export Promotion and Marginal Trade Liberalization  (1991-993)
       With the increase of efficiency and competitiveness of Chinese economy,
the significant change happened in 1991 when the third stage began.  Much
bolder trade liberalization was launched to reduce tariff rates, import mandatory
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Syrquin (1986).
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plans, import quotas and licenses.  Furthermore, import adjusting duty, export
subsidies, and all regulations, guidelines, and policies concerning about import
substitution were declared to eliminate.  Therefore, the price system turned
more sound through trade liberalization and the pattern of production and trade
became more “natural” in economic sense than that distortedly man-made in
the previous stage.  The empirical study on sources of economic growth in 12
industrial sectors during 1990-1994 shows that export promotion remained the
dominant contribution in the textile sector, in which China had most comparative
advantage, whereas other industries experienced less import substitution
promotion than before.
      However, the remaining average tariff rate and non-tariff coverage ratio
were still high, namely, 43% and 51% respectively in 1992 (World Bank,
1993b), if compared to the international level.  More importantly, the
restrictiveness and distortion of foreign exchange control system were not
alleviated and kept unfavourable to exporters.  The overvalue of real exchange
rate, about 44% in average (Table 3), harmed exports.  Additionally, export
licensing requirement and export tax were consolidated in enforcement to
relieve domestic export competition in disorder.
       Stage IV: Trade Liberalization (1994-now)
       To establish the “socialism market system” and quicken the process of
access to WTO before the deadline, China came to a new phase in 1994 when
she started the more radical trade liberalization.  As shown in Diagram 3, a
number of measures were taken to meet internal targets as well as external
requirements. Not only has the average level of trade barriers been
consecutively reduced, but the structure has been adjusted to tend to be “trade
neutrality” as well.  Producers, therefore, can calculate their input and output at
international prices and substitute capital and intermediate goods into cheaper
labours in production.  More significant reform occurred to the foreign exchange
system. The current account was completely liberalized in 1997, which made
China eventually meet the IMF’s standard of eliminating foreign exchange
control.  Meanwhile, the dual exchange rate system was abolished by merging
into a unified, managed and floated rate in 1994, and it actually depreciated
RMB nearly 50 percent in official rate.
      In short, during past five decades, China's trade development strategy has
evolved from stumbling trade to promoting trade, from inward-looking
orientation and outward-looking orientation, from anti-comparative-advantage to
pro-comparative-advantage, from forward-linkage with supply effect to
backward-linkage with demand effect, from price distortion to price correction
("making price right"), and from quantative control to tariff protection.  The
benign evolution of trade development strategy leads to the improved economic
performance. Table 4 indicates that economic growth, saving and investment,
efficiency and productivity, exports, and foreign exchange reserve all improved
significantly with the change of strategies.  On the other hand, trade
liberalization process notably follows a piecemeal and roundabout way instead
of a radical and direct approach. With transitional cost, the sectors of import
substitution were provisionally protected, partially compensated and structurally
adjusted to weaken their strong oppositions to market-oriented trade reform.
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Table  4.      Economic Performance for China’s Trade Development Strategies
Phase I
1980-1983
Phase II
1984-1990
Phase III
1991-1993
Phase IV
1994-1997
Real GDP growth (%)
Real GDP per capita growth (%)
Domestic saving rate (%)
Domestic investemnt rate (%)
Capital-output ratio
TFP growth (%)
TFP’s share in GDP growth (%)
Export  growth (%)
Manufactured export growth (%)
Share of manufactured export (%)
Foreign exchange reserve growth(%)
1.75
0.36
32.4
33.7
0.28
2.28
30.2
 7.49
 12.6
53.7
-
7.34
5.76
36.7
36.2
0.29
 1.40
 14.9
16.0
21.3
64.2
17.7
9.72
8.36
40.3
38.1
0.32
 2.90
 27.6
14.0
17.7
79.9
31.4
10.05
8.87
40.6
40.0
0.35
n. a.
n. a.
19.3
21.2
85.4
65.5
 Notes: 1. Real GDP and real GDP per capita are estimated in the price level of 1978.
             2. Domestic saving rate=(GDP-government consumption-resident consumption)/GDP
                 Domestic investment rate=(fixed capital investment+inventory)/GDP
             3. Capital-output ratio=fixed capital inventory/GDP
             4. TFP, total factor productivity, is estimated in Solow’s method.
             5. Foreign exchange reserve excludes gold.
             6. n. a., data unavailable; -, estimation not applicable
Sources: TFP during 1980-1983 from Li Jingwen and D. Jogensen (1993), eds. Productivity and Economic
Growth in US, China and Japan, Beijing: Chinese Social Science Academy Press; TFP during 1984-1994
from World Bank (1996), Chinese Economy: Fighting Inflation and Deepening reform , the County Report;
Other indicators are calculated by the author based on the data from Chinese Statistics Yearbook  (1998),
State Statistical Bureau
       What's China's trade development strategy in the future?  There is no
official announcement or explanation. Trade liberalization seems to the
mainstream in the governmental long-term reform strategy.   However, there are
two points that should be mentioned when we observe recent policy initiatives
of the authority.  First, China attempts to take advantage of “home market
effect” to extract foreign monopolistic rent, when noticing the fact that radical
import liberalization has negative effects on some national pillar industries since
the market share of the goods both imported and produced by foreign investors
has risen astonishingly fast during recent years.  Secondly, the authority is more
convinced of the great importance to accelerate the development of high-tech
industries to maintain international competitiveness in globalization.  Both of
new policy keynotes arouse the feasibility of taking “strategic trade policy” –––
the policy advocating selective activism to extract foreigners’ economic rents, or
to hatch technological and scale externality in domestic economy ––– for China.
       For the profit-shifting argument, based on the empirical study by the author
(1996), infant sectors like chemical fabrics, non-ferrous mental, transportation
equipment and telecommunication should be protected in moderate degree to
foster production and potential export by taking advantage of scale economy
and “learning-by-doing” effect.  For the externality argument, it is necessary to
subsidize high-tech industries such as microelectronics, bioengineering and
new materials, in which China has acquired predominant competitiveness to
some extent in the international arena.  The aggressive policy will accelerate
China to form industrial complexes in these sectors and ultimately lead to
national specialization.
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      Industrial Policy
      In China, the industrial policy is officially explained as the policy to “develop
key industrial sectors, foster infant industries, limit entry to declining and
superfluous sectors, and correct market distortion and failure.”  The nature of
industrial policy, therefore, is usually systemically differential among industries
rather than functional for the market.  It means that co-ordinating investment
and choosing winners seem to be the priority objective of the policy.
      In the early 1980s, the industrial policy looked like a hodgepodge with
confused signals in the result of interest balance among the Commission of
Economic Planning, local governments and other central administrative
ministries.  Then it came to be a de facto  therapy of economic tightening in the
late 1980s when the so-called “order and rectification” policy was carried out to
copy with severe macroeconomic instability. Only in 1994, right after the
Chinese Communist Party announced to establish the "socialism market
economy", was a formal industrial policy guideline, National Industrial Policy
Outline in 1990s, formulated and then revised in the following years. Notably, in
the outline, three tradable sectors ––– electronic equipment, petrochemicals,
and automobile, and one non-tradable sector ––– construction were selected as
pillar industries.  Based on the outline, the authority soon formulated the
Directory of National Industrial Policy in the Fifth Five-year Plan and Directory of
Industrial Investment for Foreign-funded Enterprises.
      In the current industrial policy with the feature of non-neutral incentive, trade
policy only plays in a secondary and supplementary role, if compared to major
measures like investment, credit, and material distribution policy.  Exports are
promoted all the time through a variety of preferential policies, even during the
“order and rectification” period.  Import policies differ a lot among sectors and
periods.  For instance, the final products of strategic sectors are protected by
prohibitive tariffs as well as quota and licensing requirement, while intermediate
inputs for those sectors can be given lower rate and even some import
subsidies.  Though levied on high tariffs in principle, capital imports are normally
offered exemption or preference in practice to support production in key sector
and construction projects.  Also, some sectors are selected to protect on the
ground that excessive imports could hinder the development of domestic
industry.  In short, import policy has to be differentiated among sectors to serve
industrial policy.
      The disperse protection structure results in over-investing and over-entry in
downstream industries in which local governments and affiliated enterprises
have great commercial interests, and therefore, the ambitious plan of the central
government to re-organize industrial structure often fails.  Automobile industry is
a typical example. Despite the rapid growth and technological accomplishment,
it still faced several systemic and structural problems, such as geographic
fragmentation, incompetence of scale production, underdevelopment of
component sectors, and lack of international competitiveness, much due to the
inefficient industrial policy in 1980s (World Bank, 1993a).  The value added of
automobile manufacturing turned to be negative if calculated on the basis of
international prices.  In addition, as shown in Table 5, the high trade protection
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and compulsory regulation of local content results in tremendous welfare loss in
the auto industry ––– 11% of the total sale revenues, and consumers, whose
welfare loss accounts for 7% of total sales revenue, are main losers.  To solve
the problem, the authority issued Automobile Industrial Policy in 1994 in order to
achieve international cost and quality in the coming years.
Table 5.  The Welfare Effect of China’s Auto Industry Policy (1994 as the Baseline)
Consumer
loss
(100 million
Yuan)
Cunsumer net
loss
(100 million
Yuan)
Producer loss
(100 million
Yuan)
Producter net
loss
(100 million
Yuan)
Total net
welfare loss
(100 million
Yuan)
Net welfare
loss per auto
(Yuan)
Trucks 337.1 30.0   30.0 4140
Passenger
cars
171.5 20.9 24.1 3.0 23.9 12383
Sedan cars 265.6 34.1 70.8 20.8 54.9 21931
Total
complete
vehicles
774.2 85.0 94.9 23.8 108.8 9316
Parts and
components
n.a. n.a. 104.4 24.7 n.a. n.a.
Efficiency loss(100 million Yuan)         48.5                      Dislocation loss(100 million Yuan)  133.5
Notes:  Total net welfare loss is the sum of cunsumer net loss and producer net loss.  Efficiency loss
is the sum of producer net loss in producing complete vehicles and auto compenents.  Dislocation loss is
the sum of consumer net loss and efficiency loss.
Source: Author’s estimation (1998)
      National Economic Security
      Given the political ideology confrontation and vulnerable economic power in
the history, China regards national security as the symbol of independence and
sovereignty.  According to The Law of Foreign Trade (1994), any export and
import harming to health, culture, environment and other public interests will be
prohibited.  Moreover, a few strategic sectors are also limited or restricted so as
to establish or accelerate domestic development.  Agricultural and financial
sectors are two typical cases.
       Agricultural sector
       Currently, grain, cotton, wool, and sugar are agricultural goods listed in
import control directory and only specialized state-owned trade companies are
entitled to deal in such commodities and strictly follow national mandatory plans
and import quotas.  In parallel to the officially declared target saying that  “the
self-reliance ratio will not be lower than 95% and net import will not exceed 5%
of domestic consumption”, grain imports, for example, are now limited by tariff-
rate quotas (TRQs, 3%), and out-of-quota tariff rates are as high as more than
100%.  In addition, all grain imports must be canalized through public trade
companies.
         From the viewpoint of comparative advantage, there are no relatively
abundant resource endowments for China to produce grain to feed her people
because 22 percent of population in the world rely on only seven percent of
cultivated land and water source on the earth1.  Domestic grain price has risen
dramatically since the price reform in the 1980s and overall exceeded the
                                                                
1 Information Office of State Council (1996), White Paper on Grain in China
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international market price level since 1994.  However, price increase didn’t
stimulate the growth of grain production, which shows that China is being
gradually lost her advantage in grain production due to the dynamic
industrialization.
       Why does Chinese authority still cling to the autarky policy of grain?  The
main reasons can be explained in following aspects:
       (a) The grain policy is not only an acute economic issue, but also a crucial
political matter when taken account of some unforgettable historical lessens,
such as the starvation before liberation, trade embargo by western countries in
the era of Cold War, famine disaster in the late of 1950s, unemployment in rural
areas, and challenging task of poverty alleviation in the contemporary national
social development plan.
        (b) As a rule approved by some industrialized countries, with the economic
development and structural change, agriculture in China will inevitably change
from the sector taxed to support other industry into that to be supported by other
industry.  Owing to the increasing family disposable income, reduced Engle's
Coefficient and structural change of food consumption, trade protection on grain
could be more endured by the public in China.
        (c) The empirical study shows that the prospect of grain production in
China is not so optimistic if considering factors like regional market segment,
low commercializing ratio, obsolete agricultural technology, high reserve cost,
population mobility, and redistribution to low-income people, although grain
production seems to be stable during the past years.   In addition, skeptics also
question whether China is able to afford to import a large amount of grain by the
scarce foreign exchanges.
       (d) The self-reliance grain policy also reflects the authority’s conservative
vision and attitude towards the prospect of international grain market, especially
to Prof. Brown’s (1995) deliberately exaggerated argument that “who will feed
China in next century”.  The authority reaffirmed the policy to conciliate the
panic caused by  “China’s threat to world grain market”.
       (e) The autarky policy can help to stabilize domestic price level due to the
fact that there exists high correlation between grain price index and retail
(consumer) price index in both urban and rural areas.  Meanwhile, external
price fluctuation in the international grain market can be effectively isolated in
order to facilitate domestic price reform in a sound and smooth way.
       (f) Adhered to trade protection policy, the government hopes to enhance
average income of farmers whose annual earnings still primarily come from
grain production in most rural regions.  It will undoubtedly serve to reduce
income unequal distribution between rural and urban areas, improve the term of
trade between agricultural and industrial goods, and eventually alleviate poverty
in countryside and achieve the social justice.
       The result of CGE model simulation for China’s grain policy indicates that
given the current agricultural policy the “natural” self-reliance ratio inclines to
drop in the future and there will be great welfare loss and higher on-border
protection rates needed to counteract low international prices if the targeted
self-reliance ratio (95%) is to be maintained (Yang and Huang, 1997b). Will
China’s traditional grain policy be changed in the near future?  The answer will
depends partly on the negotiation of China’s accession to WTO, because
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according to the provision of WTO, only so-called “green box” measures can be
used to support agricultural production, and it also partly on the ideological
change of policy makers, for instance, into a academic popularized proposition
of “food-exchange-food” within agricultural sector.
       Financial sector       
       The of liberalization of financial services has been gradually progressive
because of the nature of political and economic sensitivity as well as the
attempt to keep it in harmony with the speed and process of overall economic
reform.  The government is currently applying a number of restrictive laws and
arbitrary regulations in terms of the extent and conditions of market access.
Foreign banking service providers, for instance, complain that they are only
allowed to operate under selective “experimental” licenses with strict operational
requirements, limits on the forms of establishment for entry, and restrictions on
the geographic scope of activities.  In line with her efforts to join the WTO,
China has begun to allow greater foreign participation in banking services on a
trial basis.  For example, the State Council followed up on plans announced in
January 1996 to allow foreign banks in Shanghai's Pudong area to conduct
local currency transactions on a restricted trial basis.  Foreign financial
institutions, however, still needed approval for new representative offices and
branches, which was granted on a discretionary, case-by-case basis. The
scope of activities for these banks and branches was limited largely to business
denominated in foreign currencies, essentially carving out the entire domestic
market and leaving only international trade related business.  In the most recent
offer submitted to WTO, China proposed to eliminate, upon accession, all
geographic restriction on the establishment of foreign banks and further to relax
limits on local currency operation.
       The liberalization process by a self-imposed "experimental, step-by-step
approach" inflects the authority’s ambivalence towards opening banking
industry.  On the one hand, China has to make commitments to opening her
financial market because they are dispensable part of Protocol for access to
WTO.  Foreign banks can not only provide capital inflows for China to sustain
her high economic growth but also carve out an intermediate for China to raise
fund in international capital market.  Moreover, the modern commercial banking
system in China can be established by both learning from experience and
benefiting from externality of foreign banks in terms of operation, management,
technology and human resource.
       On the other hand, the central government holds a cautious attitude
towards financial liberalization when taking account of following considerations:
       (a) Hasty financial liberalization may cause overheating in economy and
subsequently destabilize the macroeconomy, which is the lesson that the
government draws from the disorder in domestic financial market occurred in
1993-994.  It reminds the authority of that “financial liberalization must keep
steps with the economic development, financial deepening, foreign trade,
competence of financial industry and surveillance capacity”.
       (b) Most of state-owned commercial banks are running in the bad
performance according to the international standard, largely attributed to
historical "policy loans" in low interest rates to inefficient public enterprises as
well as the loose internal operation system. The unperforming loan ratio of four
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largest commercial banks is officially said to be 20-25% and even as higher as
30-40% estimated by some international financial agencies1. Hence, the
government decided to postpone radical liberalization in order to give the
domestic banking system a buffer to restore efficiency and competitiveness.
       (c) According to the Barsel Agreement (1983), the central bank in host
country is responsible for supervising foreign-funded banks and their branches
in the collaboration with its partners in home countries.  The surveillance system
and institutional capacity of the People’s Bank of China (PRC, China’s central
bank), however, are still comparatively immature and vulnerable so that it needs
a transitional period to formulate rules and consolidate management.
       (d) The loans of foreign banks to joined-ventures, which are regarded as
equivalence of external debt in China, have increased significantly in recent
years and become the largest share in local foreign debts.  Some loans were
transferred to domestic enterprises in various disguised ways, and a
considerable portion of them were invested in real estates and security.  All
these phenomena make the central government more alert to risk management
of foreign debts by limiting the market access of foreign banks.
       (e) Finally, China’s ambitious reform of capital account liberalization by the
end of 2000 was unexpectedly deferred by the financial turmoil of East Asia in
1997-1998. The financial liberalization process turns to be sluggish when the
government realizes that foreign banks and their off-shore business are one of
sources for speculative attack to local currency.  Indeed, shown in Diagram 4,
the banking system is the principal media of financing short-term foreign capital
into real estate and bonds market and then induces the overheating of a bubble
economy. Therefore, it is no surprise for Chinese authority to tighten regulation
on capital flows and put foreign banks in scrutiny in recent years.
Diagram 4.  Financial Crisis for East Asia: Causes
    
                                                                   Capital Inflow
     
                   Macroeconomic                                                                     Banking System
                    Fundamentals
                                                                        Financial
                                                                    Systematic Risk
                Macroeconomic                                                                        Banking  credit
                  Disequilibrium                                                                               growth
                                                                   Increasing Assets
                                                                    at Domestic Price
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1 "China Issues in Focus: China's Banking Structural Reform ", Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Morgan
Stanley Asia Limited, 1998/4/27; Goldenman Sachs, Morgan Stanley (Asia), NOMURA Singapore Limited.
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      Nevertheless, the steps by the PRC to crack down on unauthorized foreign
exchange transactions resulted in disruption of the operations of foreign banks
to some extent.
       Balance of Payment
       Maintaining balance of payment is one of fundamental principles for
China’s trade policy.  Essentially, foreign exchanges are only used for imports
of key technology and equipment, scarce intermediate goods, and some
consumer necessities. China states that she will try to fulfil balance of payment
by export promotion rather than reducing imports. However, like other countries,
China’s trade policy also roots in the trade philosophy of “new mercantilism”,
which implies that
      (a) Trade deficit in the long run should be corrected by any means;
      (b) Exports are positive whereas imports are negative; and
      (c) Imports will depend on exports.
       As shown in Diagram 5, the balance payment of current account is
evidently associated with four macroeconomic cycles1 from 1982-1997 and
particularly, trade deficit in the late 1980s and early 1990s were soon corrected
by tigtening the economy.  In addition, with the structural change in
industralization, service trade has been more in deficit during recent years and it
could be one of reasons that the authority is unwilling to offer substantial
concessions in service for foreigners.
Diagram 5.   Balance of Payment for China: Time Series ( Million US$, 1982-1997)
                     
                   Notes:  The solid line for balance payment of commodity trade, the dotted line for
                                service trade, and the columes for current account balance
                   Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook , 1982-1998
        Balance of payment is also essential to the accumulation of foreign
exchange reserve, which is usually considered as the relatively scarce resource
                                                                
1 They are 1982-1986, 1986-1990, 1991-1993, 1994-1997.
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for China because of currency inconvertibility.  The estimation of import function
with error-correction model indicates the strong relation between import
volumes and foreign exchange reserve (IMF, 1994), which explains the reason
why the government controls imports by considering the growth of reserve.
       Foreign exchange control of current account had been strictly held until
China accomplished IMF Clause 8(2) (3) (4) to become a member “without
foreign exchange restriction” in 1996.  Yet, it is “conditional” current account
liberalization because only sale and purchase of foreign exchanges are
permitted, and domestic companies are not allowed to own their bank accounts
in foreign exchanges.  The authority also carried out some provisional
measures to prevent capital flight, particularly during the financial crisis of East
Asia.
        Domestic Interest Groups
        Central Administrative Ministries
        The decision-making power of trade policy in China is substantially
delegated to administrative body, namely, the State Council, instead of the
legislative ––– the People's Congress, though all trade laws and regulations
have to be ratified by the Congress. Diagram 5 illustrates the oganizational
structure of a complex set of trade policies administered by a range of
occasionally overlapping ministers and agencies.  The Standing Committee of
State Council is the the supreme in the executive hierarchy, but it is often
subordinated to the Central Finance and Economic Leading Group of the
Chinese Communist Party, a joint commission of the Politibureau and State
Council, composing of only a few senior party leaders and in charge of all
crucial economic issues in China.  The parallel structure reflects the dominate
leadership of the party as the "principle" and its delegation relationship with the
government as the "agent". In general, there is a vice prime minister delegated
to take responsibility of foreign trade and several ministries or bureaus will
share powers in the decision-making.  The most important organizations are the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MFTEC), mainly taking
charge of negotiating international trade agreement and formulating national
trade policy, the State Planning Commission (SPC), the institutional legacy of
economic planning system, and the State Economic and Trade Commission
(SETC), focusing on trade management reforms in state-owned foreign trade
companies and enterprises.
       In lack of a single and integrated department responsible for making trade
policies, ministries concerned have to reach a flexible consensus through
comprehensive discussion, coordination and bargain.  In China, it is called
guikou (proper channel) and zhengchuduomen (a policy made by several
institutions) and in other words, named as “participatory bureaucracy” or
“institutional pluralism”.  Bureaucratic fragment in the overlapping power-sharing
system occasionally result in disputes and conflicts among administrative
bodies and they have to escalate problems to senior politicians in higher
hierarchy for to decide. Self-centered sense of different ministries is much
attributed to their “natural” administrative functions, official promotion system,
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special benefit from the regulated industry and enterprises, and even corruption
with bribery. Finally, it is still a black box in the bureaucratic coordination and
bargain arena. Once the policy is formulated, it is often stated as "common
sense of consensus" and no further public debate is allowed.
       Diagram 6 also shows how central administrative ministries specifically
interact with one another in different trade policy measures. The typical case is
import quota and license.  As shown in Diagram 7, import quotas are divided
into those of general commodities and machinery and electronic products.
General commodities cover key agricultural and industrial materials that are
deemed to essential to China's economy and people's livehood and their quotas
are decided by the State Planning Commission (SPC) in the negotiation with
various specialized ministries or bureaus, state-owned enterprises and trading
companies. Once import “demand” is determined, SPC allocates quotas that
are eventually distributed nation-wide to end-users and administered by local
branches of SPC agencies.  The Machinery and Electronics Export and Import
Office, led by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), is
responsible for coordinating and administering imports of mechanic and
electronic equipment.  Morevoer, the Ministry of Foreign Economic and Trade
Co-operation (MOFTEC) uses import documents (licenses) to exercise an
additional, nation-wide system of control over some other imports.  Many
products are subject to both quotas and import licensing requirements. For
these products, after permission has been granted by other designated
agencies for importation, MOFTEC must decide whether to  issue a license, and
it claims that import licenses are issued automatically once other agencies have
approved an import.
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Diagram  6.    The Oganizational Structure of China’s Trade Adiministration
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Diagram 7.      The Import Quota and Licensing Requirement in China
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       Source: Author’s compilation
       Concerning other policy measures, there are similar cases for interministrial
negotiations and coordinations.  For example, tariff reduction initiatives in
international trade agreement negotiation by MOFETC must be ractified by the
Custom Tariff Commission (CTC) whose principal responsibility is to defend
national sovereignty of tariff. In addition, tariff concession of sensitive sectors
may be opposed by the ministries or bureaus concerned at the excuse of
safeguarding national economic security or protecting infant industries.  The
Ministry of Information Industries (including telecommunication), for instance,
fiercely objected to opening China's monopolized telecommunication market to
foreign investors, which made MOFETC waveringly submit China's schedule to
WTO Parties. In the field of anti-dumping, SETC and MOFETC should
indepentently  conduct investigation that whether there exist dumping and
material injury to the industry concerned, and the final outcome must be
approved by CTC.  Also,  in recent years, MOFETC hoped to promote exports
by means of more preferential export tax rebate, but the initiative inherently
collide with the goal of the Ministry of Finance ––– to increase public revenue in
the transitional period and eventually balance government budget in 2000. Only
after the financial crisis in East Asia were export tax rebate rates of some
products adjusted higher to alleviate domestic economic deflation.  Finally, the
People’s Bank of China set the currency stability as the priority during the
financial turmoil, while MOFETC and other industrial ministers complained
export stagnation due to  the real appreciation of RMB.
       Local Governments
       The relation between central government and local government is one of
most subtle issues in China.  Since the reform, more and more decision-making
powers have been decentralized to local authorities, particularly in fiscal
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respect.  Policy work conference enfranchises provinces in the policy-making
process and offers local governments equal formal representation as minstries
(Shirk, 1993).  Local governments in different levels now have their own
economic and social development plans parallel to the central government’s.  A
newly-coming-on national policy usually arouses their great concerns about
income distribution and social justice among regions.  They also care of the
responsibilities that must be taken for local constituencies.  As far as trade
policy is concerned, the central-local relation and local-local relation are
depicted in Table 6. The following part will deal with aspects listed in the table.
Table 6.      Local Authorities’ Influence on Trade Policy
 Export promotion
policies
Import preferential
policies
Import restriction
policies
 Central-local relation  Foreign trade
responsibility contract
 Industrial policy  Trade liberalization
 Local-local relation Foreign exchange
retention & adjustment;
Regional policy
 Regional policy Investment policy
related to imports
Source: Author’s cmpilation
       Foreign trade responsibility contract
       Foreign trade responsibility contract system was formally carried out in
national wide in 1988 in order to reduce the increasing fiscal loss that were
incurred by export subsidies of the central government.  To encourage local
governments to share self-disciplined responsibility, the reform changed the
traditional vertical trade administration structure (tiaotiao) into provincial
autonomy (kuaikuai).  Under the new system, local governements would sign
responsibility contract with the central government, including the basic amount
of foreign exchange revenues, foreign exchange remittance, and export
subisidy.  More importantly, local governments would afford all export subsidies
to local foreign trade companies that would be delinked from national foreign
trade corporations in Beijing.  The new policy took effect in the short run by
improving economic performance and curtailing export subsidy loss, but later
led to the serious regional segmentation and local protectionism during the late
1980s. To implement trade contracts, provinces set up various forms of
interregional barriers, such as tansport license, export embargo and resource
tax, to block outflow of production materials.  A large number of anecdotal
evidences were found during the period, among which the most famous were
"cotton war", "wool war", "tobacco war", "silk war", and "tea war".  In addition,
exports were in intensive competition with dumping price (Yang, Zhu, and
Sheng, 1998).  As a resulit, export subsidies continued to increase and reached
the historical peak in 1989.  Trade responsibility contract was finally abolished
in 1994.
       Foreign exchange retention and dual exchange rates system   
       Foreign exchange retention system, which allowed trade companies to
retain the certain percentage of foreign exchange revenue and sell them at
more preferential rate in the swap market, was initiated at the very beginning of
economic reform to promote exports.  In the early stage, the retention ratio was
formulated on the regional basis, tilting to certain provinces in the southeast
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China and minority autonomous municipalities.  Other provinces then
complained about  “unfairness” of the reform.  The central government
subsequently revised it into the policy on the industrial basis in 1991, which
acutually led to multiple exchange rates.  But it didn’t eliminate regional
segment and unfair competition as expected, because most of inland provinces,
where resource-intensive industries were given much lower retention rates to
discourage their exports, were still losers for the new policy.  The problem
prevailed until the foreign exchange retention system was repealed in 1994.
       Although the foreign exchange adjusting system was established in 1980 to
accommodate the retention system mention above, the true swap market
(FEACs) in national wide didn't appear until 1986.  However, since then,
interregional transaction of retained foreign exchanges was still occasionally
hindered due to institutional flaw, technical incompatibility and more importanly,
reluctance of local government to meet market demand from outside provinces.
The negative effects in such a provisional regime were eventually eliminated
when a unified and managed floating exchange rate system and national
foreign exchange eletronic transaction market were established in 1994.
       Import restriction and local investment policy
       Local authorties have been entitled to invest on their own favourite projects
since 1985.  Unfortunately, local projects sometimes didn't fall in accord with
guidelines or directives made by the State Planning Commission because of the
distorted price system and different profit rates.  The game between SPC and
local governments usually occurred in assembled industries, such as durable
consumer products (colour TV, refrigerators, bicycle, etc). The central
government often worried about reduplicate investment, over-capacity and
disorder competition in those sectors, while local authorities attempted to
capture alluring short-term profits as soon as possible.  Though imports of
assemble line and key equipment were limited by quota and licensing
requirement as well as foreign exchange restrictions, they were still available to
local enterprises through a variety of informal channels under the acquiescence
of local governments.  A typical case is import of refrigerator compressors, half
of which were not given the authorized permission of import licenses in 1988.
Ultimately, the central government could only resort to issuing production
licenses in order to shut down some non-eligible factories.
       Preferential Import and import liberalization policy
       Local governments will respond differently to national import policy due to
their distinguished industrial competitiveness.  The empirical study of revealed
comparetive advantage (RCA) for 30 provinces in China shows that the
provinces in the coast area have the advantage of producing capital goods and
consumer goods, while the provinces in the middle and west areas dominate in
producing mining and intermediate products. As regards preferential import
policy, enterprises in the coast region benefit a lot from the regulation on
processed trade and compensation trade, which now account for more than
50% of total trade in China, because imports of intermediate goods to re-export
production are tariff-exempt and license-exempt.  The preferential treatment
particularly applies to those “enclaves”, say, Special Economic Zones, tax-free
zones, and export zones in coastal cities.  On the other hand, the import goods
given preferential treatment are just substitute of products in which the
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provinces in the middle and west region most specialize.  They are complaining
that the preferential import policy for processed trade, a sort of rent-creating
supplied by the central government, is harmful to the economic development of
the impoverished inland provinces and should be abolished.  However, the
policy still remains in valid because of the strong commercial interest pursued
by coastal provinces and joint-ventures.
       Concerning import liberalization reform, local governments are very
sensitive to reduction of tariff and NTBs on the industries which are of great
importance to local budget revenue and employment.  In lack of an adequate
social security system, local governments are likely to bear the bulk of financial
burdens from the massive lay-offs of state-owned enterprises, which were
appromixately 10 percent of total urban labour force just in 19981.  The problem
is peculiarly acute  in the Northeast China where local authority is complaining a
lot about import competition in capital-intensive industries, like iron and steel,
electronic appliance, and automobile sectors.
       Domestic Companies and Enterprises
       With the modernization and democratization,  domestic enterprises witness
the historical change of free expression of their commercial interests from a
informal, scattered, and implicit fashion to a formal, associated, and explicit
style, though such an expression should always be legitimate, cautious and
occasionally cracked down by the authority.  Industrial associations and trade
chambers report member enterprises’ opinions, advices, and complainings to
the designed  ministries or local governments. However, to a large extent, as
official or semi-official organizations in a corporatism state, they are still under
the control and scrutiny of the authority, and therefore they differ from the
counterparts in western countries with the function of active professional
lobbying and rent-seeking.  Some trade chambers are delegated to allocate
export quotas and licenses and co-ordinate export prices among member
companies.  In general, a trade chambers is manipulated by several leading
public trade companies and enterprises in the industry.
        Most lobbying activities happen between individual enterprise and central
ministry or local agency with regulatory authority over its business by means of
behind-the-scene persuasion, complaint, and exchange.  They are private,
secretive affairs, just like policy making itself.  In addition, there are a few formal
venues, for instance, policy consultant conferences, hearings, and work report
meetings, for enterprises to influence the policy formation to less extent.  The
validity of rent-seeking much depends on the nature and status of enterprises
and their network (guanxi) with competent officials.  In specific, there are acute
differences between public enterprises and private enterprises, large-and-
medium enterprises and small-scale enterprises, bad-performance enterprises
and good-performance enterprises, large tax remittance enterprises and small
tax payment enterprises, coastal enterprises and inland enterprises, upstream
industrial enterprises and downstream enterprises, high-tech enterprises and
labour-intensive enterprise, and domestic enterprises and foreign-funded
                                                                
1 State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems (SCRES, 1997), China’s Tariff Policy in
Transution, Beijing.
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enterprises. The case study on export quota bidding reform of magnesium
during 1993-1996 indicates that both state-owned trade companies and foreign-
funded enterprise were favoured by the exclusive access to a large portion of
quotas, while many small companies, most of which were private or township
enterprises, were apparently biased.  Another case conducted in the fieldwork is
about import quota policy of cotton in 1997.  To protect cotton production in
Xinjiang as import sustitution, MOFTEC suddenly imposed restrictive quota on
cotton imports and it immediately stirred the fierce opposition of domestic textile
enterprises and joint ventures in the southeast provinces.  Finally, the authority
gave in.
       Among all forms of enterprises, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should be
singled out to emphasize on.  Although the importance of SOEs in Chinese
economy has been steadily declined since the reform, they still dominate a
number of pillar industries, most of which are capital-intensive sectors that
China has comparative disadvantage, and exercise significant monopoly over
most of service sectors.  Due to soft budget constraint and poor management in
the history, more than half of SOEs are now running in red.  The recent
challenge for SOEs comes from massive lay-offs in the governmental structural
adjustment reform.  Under such circumstances, SOEs have turned to be the
most important obstacle to trade liberalization.  They tend to "walk on one leg"
and deal with the authority directly, and therefore, both central and local
governments are often confronted with "blackmailing" of some SOEs.
       Traditionally, when faced to unfair import competition, dometic firms had
been contained by the authority or informationally ingored due to the lack of
legal channels until China’s Foreign Trade Law (1994) and Regulations on Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duty (1996) were issued.  The procedure of quasi-
juridical administrative protection provides Chineses enterprises a legal, fast-
track, and effective platform to counteract unfair foreign competition.  In late
1997, China launched her first antidumping investigation case ––– against
Canadian, Korean and U.S. newsprint producers.  Finally, MOFTEC announced
a preliminary determination that newsprint from above three countries had been
dumped in China at margins of up to 79 percent below domestic prices. On an
interim basis, importers of newsprint from three countries must post cash
guarantees equal in value to the margin assessed against it.  The ultilateral
action temporarily relieved the severe import shock to domestic paper industry
running in red, and more importantly presented a demonstration effect for
others in the future.
       Foreign-funded Enterprises
       Traditionally and currently, foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) have a
unique status in Chinese economy.  They have been given many preferential
treatments in the realm of income tax system, investment regulation, trade
policy and financial arragement.  Compared with other developing countries,
there are fewer compulsory obligations on export ratio, local content, and equity
ratio requirment for them. The Chinese authority eagerly expects foreign direct
investment (FDI) to accelerate economic growth, increase employment,
upgrade technology and human resource, and induce benign competition in
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domestic market.  In the local level, contracted FDI and actual inflow are
regarded as main standards to evaluate the political performance of leading
officials.   As shown in Table 7, FDI has the significant impact on industrial
output, fixed capital investment, manufactured exports, and employments in
China. The situation applies to coastal cities in particular.  Hence, foreign
investors are usually able to take full advantage of internal competitions among
regions to bargain with local officials for more preferential treatments and better
business environment that they can provide.
Table 7.   FDI’s Impact on China’s Economy (1991-1995)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Actual FDI inflow (billions of US$) 4.4 11.2 27.5 33.8 37.5
FDI’s share in total domestic investment (%) 4.5 8 13.6 18.3 25
FFEs’ exports (billions of US$) 12.1 17.4 25.2 34.7 46.6
Share of FFEs’ exports in total (%) 17 20.4 27.5 28.7 31.3
Share of FFE’s industrial output in total (%) 5 6 9 11 13
Employments in FFEs 4.8 6 10 14 16
Share of tax revenue from FFEs in total (%) … 4.1 … … 11.2
Note: …, data unavailable
Source: Databank of MOFTEC, Chinese State Tax Bureau, UNTCAD, and World Bank
       Since 1993, with the increasing volume and changing structure of FDI, the
market penetration ratio of products made by joint-ventures has jumped off, and
a large number of public enterprises have been merged or acquired by
multinational corporations.  Some local officials and entrepreneures, united by
academics, charged the situation partly on the preferential policies to which
foreigners had been offered.  To smooth social panic, the central government
was determined to adjust the policy towards FDI in order to provide a fair
playground for both joint-ventures and domestic enterprises.  In 1996, a new
policy to phase out tariff exemption for material and capital equipment imports
of joint-venture was announced.  As a result, contracted foreign investment, the
indicator to symbolize future business investment in China, declined steeply
during the following years.  It was said that a move to impose normal tariffs on
foreign investors was raising project costs to commercially unacceptable levels.
In 1997 and 1998, the financial crisis in East Asia aggravated the dooming
situation. To boom aggregate demand and relieve the deflation, in the late 1997
China declared a reversal of course on her planned two-year phase-out of tariff
exemption and the previous preferential treatment for foreign investors were
almost restored.
       Military
       Like other developing countries, military (the People’s Liberation Army,
PLA) has its particular and eminent status in Chinese politics and economy.
Since the national defence reform in the mid of 1980s, the buget expenditure on
military has been cut considerably to support economic development. As a sort
of financial compensation, military forces were permitted to establish their own
affiliated companies and given many preferential fiscal and trade policies.  For
example, all export products made by these enterprises were allowed to retain
full foreign exchange revenues.  It is estimated that the total value added of
38
amy-affiliated companies accounted for about two percentage of GDP at the
early of 1990s and they provided more than 60 thousand employment
opportunities for non-military staff.  Some of the military's businesses were
respectable while others were patently illegal, such as smuggling and hoarding.
Unfortunately, the illegal activities engaged by military with their special
background became more and more severe in recent years.  In particular,
smuggling was so rampant in some coastal regions that it led to the nullification
of custom administration, tariff revenue loss, prevailing grey market, and import
shock to key industries, like crude oil sector.  Civilian businesspersons
complained that PLA enterprises enjoyed unfair advantages and senior
politicians were concerned over corruption and moral degeneration in military.
In August 1998, the central government launched an ambitious program to
standardize regulatory enforcement as part of an anti-smuggling campaign.
Meanwhile, all of companies in relation with military were forced to completely
separate from business within a definite time period and the expense would be
entirely compensated by a lump-sum financial transfer through tax revenues.
The resolute decision ended the controversial history of military’s involvement in
the commerce during the past two decades.
       Other Social Interest Groups
       Consumers
       Obviously, Chinese consumers could benefit a lot from trade liberalization
with low price and high quality.  The CGE model stimulation shows that most
residents will increase their welfare and real consumption through different
trade liberalization packages and they should be more welcomed by consumers
in higher income class (Yang and Huang, 1997a).  However, Chinese
consumers have traditionally been very weak in the political process and
therefore have few impact on the decision-making of trade policy.  Although
there exit some semi-official organizations, like the Chinese Consumers
Association, their function has nothing to do with representing and articulating
interest of consumers to lobby trade policy.  Finally, the well-known "free-rider
problem" (Olson, 1965), heterogeneity among Chinese consumers, and their
psychological ambivalence to trade liberalization also nullify their collective
force to influence the trade policy formation.
       Farmers
       Despite the fact that they account for approximately 80 percent of the total
population in China, farmers seem never to play any significant role in the
authority's decision-making.  They are scattered widely in geographical sense
and hardly organized.  Their are normally depressed and poorly educated to
understand the intellectual meaning of trade liberalization.
       Union
       As a quasi-official association led by the party and state, the nature of
Union in China is totally distinct from that in western countries.  Lobbying for
protection from import shock, increasing wages and asking for better working
conditions are never seen as in the agenda.
39
        Foreign Interests and Commitments to World Trade System
        Multilateralism: World Trade System and China’s Accession to WTO
        Since 1986 when China submitted her application to GATT, to meet
requirement of the membership has been the most important external factor to
influence her traditional closed-style decision-making process.  In the early
years, China hoped to be given permanent MFN or GPS status by renewal the
membership in GATT so as to increase the market access to developed
countries when the new protectionism was prevailing in 1980s.  The
government also expected to solve bilateral trade disputes with main trade
partners in multilateral dispute settlement framework.  Furthermore, the isolation
from the world trade system seemed to mismatch China’s political status in
international affairs and her market-oriented economic reform.  Although China
was quite disappointed and humiliated at unsuccessful accession to GATT
before WTO was established in 1994, she didn’t close the door to negotiations.
The most important reason is that new Chinese leaders are determined to
conform international rules, persist open-door policy and follow market-oriented
economic reform.  They are more politically bold and charismatically wise than
elder politicians and strategically achor China's future in the globalization and
international policy coordination.  The principles of world trade system –––
transparency, fair and impartial judicial practices, peaceful settlement of
disputes, the rule of law ––– are those leaders hope to advance in China and
worldwide.
       On the other hand, main WTO contracting parties, U.S. and EU in
particular, changed their attitudes and strategies to China’s application after the
Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989.  Besides political ideology confrontation,
they also intended to concentrate more on demanding commercial issues.
Specifically, they tried to seize the opportunity to enable China to accelerate
economic reforms which hopefully resulted in transforming her political system.
In other words, the process of accession to GATT/WTO is able to ratchet up
Chinese internal reform and keep reformists' bicycle going on.  In addition, they
wanted to lock-in China in a rules-based international trade system and keep
her from disturbing the managed trade order as a free rider.  The commitment
to institutional rules can be regarded as an ex ante chain set on China to
prevent market disruption and system friction.  Finally, the GATT/WTO
negotiation being an opener, they seeked to prey China’s emerging huge
market as much as possible to obtain a protocol on the commercially
meaningful basis.  The United States also took full advantage of negotiation to
comprehensively settle bilateral trade disputes with China, her second largest
trade partner with trade deficit.
      According to the accession process depicted in Diagram 8, Table 8 reviews
the detailed time schedule of China's accesstion to GATT/WTO.  There are four
phases that are dealt with as follows for China's exhausted journey.
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Diagram 8.      WTO Accession Procedure
Source: Author’s compilation on WTO (1999), Technical Note on the Accession Process.
WT/ACC/7, note by the Secretariat; Michalopoulos (1999), WTO Accession for Countries in
Transition, WTO Internal Achieve.
       (a) Factual examination and institutional reforms
       On the basis of the Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime presented
by the Chinese delegation in 1987, China’s economic and trade legal regimes
were examined and inquired by GATT contracting parties, and in particular the
areas of inconsistancy with GATT agreement were identified.  To meet the
member qualification of “non-planned economy”, three rounds of
comprehensive economic and trade reforms were carried out in 1984-87, 1988-
90, and 1991-1993, covering issues of ownership system, price system, trading
rights, trade mandatory plan, export subsidy, foreign exchange, etc.  With such
reforms Chinese authority gradually enacted tha laws, developed the institutions
and applied the policies that enabled her to conform to the fundamental rules
and disciplines of GATT.  Finally, in early 1992 the Chinese Communist Party
clarified the goal to establish the “socialism market economy”.
       (b) Negotiations and suspension
       After the submittion of revised the Memorandum in 1993, the process
moved on to negotiate the terms of accession related to GATT rules, goods and
service.  China's intinial schedule of "offers" for market access was focused on
tariffs and then broadened to cover non-tariff barriers, intellectual property, and
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a small number of service sectors requested by main contracting parties. After
signing The Sino-U.S. Memorandum on Market Access, China launched her
unprecedented import liberalization by reducing tariffs and quantitive measures
in 1992.  The government also completed another round of massive import
reforms, including current account liberalization and elimination of dual foreign
exchange rates, before the deadline to finalize the renewal GATT membership
by the end of 1994.  In spite of significant macroeconomic and trade reforms,
China could still hardly meet the demanding requirement of main parties, who
requested that China should access to GATT as a "developed country".  Under
such impending circumstances, China delivered an ultimatum to main parties,
saying that the negotiation had to be finished by the deadline time.
Unfortunately, it failed and China furiuosly declared the negotiation would not
resume unless she was invited by contracting parties.
                            Table 8.  The Timetable of China’s Accession to GATT/WTO
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Working
Party
meetings
*july,
applica
tion
*Mar.,
establi
shed
*Oct.
*Feb.
*Apr.
*June
*Sept.
*Feb.
*Mar.
*Apr.
*Dec.
*Sept. *Feb.
*Oct.
*Dec.
*Mar.
*May
*Sept.
*Mar.
*july
*Dec.
*July *Mar.
*Nov.
*Mar.
*May
*Aug.
*Dec.
*Apr.
*July
Memorandum *Feb *Dec. *May
*Sept.
Q & A *Nov. *Mar. *Mar.
*Apr.
*July
Data and annex
Price
control
*July *July
Agriculture *June *Apr.
Tariff *Feb.
*Oct.
*Mar. *May *Oct. *Apr.
NTBs *Mar. *July *May
*July
Service *Apr.
Export *July *Feb.
Subsidy *july *Apr.
Others *7 *June
*Dec.
*Apr.
*May
Concession
Goods *Sept.
Service *Apr.
*Sept.
 *Oct.  *Dec. *Nov.
WP’s draft
protocol
*Dec. *Mar.
*May
WP’s draft
report
*Dec. *May.
Source: Author’s compilation on WTO(1998),The People's Republic of China's Accession to the
World Trade Organization, Non-Attributable Background Note, and Technical Note on the
Accession Process, Annex 1, Status of Working Party Accessions: China.  WT/ACC/7, WTO Secretariat,
10 March, 1999.
       (c) Restarting negotiation and bargain process
       After one-year suspension in the Working Party talk and harsh Sino-U.S.
trade war on market access and intellectual property right protection, the
negotiation resumed by main parties’ invitation in 1995. However, it became
extremely stumbling and exhausting because the new offer requested by
contracting parties were alternatively based on the issues reached in the
Uruguay Round, particularly including tariff bounds, agriculture commitments, a
large number of service schedules. Trade talks proceeded in a go-and-stop
style during the following years, much depending on the China-U.S. economic
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and diplomatic relation.  Nevertheless, there was some progress of China’s
commitments in trading rights, agriculture, and piecemeal opening demestic
service markets.
      (d) Accelerating negotiation and approaching the final stage
      Obviously, China accelarated the negotiation with WTO contracting parties
since the early of 1999 because she was worried that the requested offer would
be more demanding if new round of multilateral trade negotiation duely started
in Seattle at the end of year.  Except for a short interval due to U.S. bombing
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the bilateral trade negotiation was going on in a
constructive approach, and eventually, on November 15, a major watershed
marked in China-U.S. relation.  According to the agreement, China made
substantial concessions on agriculture, information technology products, and
telecommunication, banking, and insurance sectors. In addition, during past
weeks, some exhilarating breakthroughs had occurred both to China and the
world as well. On May 19, the China-EU market access agreement was
reached, which can be seen as another vital step to break the deadlock of trade
negotiations between China and major WTO Working Parties. On 25 May, the
US House of Representatives, after fierce debate and lobbying, voted to
approve Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China.  Hopefully, the
U.S. Senate is also supposed to endorse PNTR when it votes on the matter in
the coming weeks. These historical events have now brought China ever closer
to the WTO membership than before. But much work remains to be done.
Importantly, China must come to terms on bilateral market access agreements
with several countries including Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and
Switzerland. The Working Party on China's accession must also complete its
load of procedure and secretarial work.
       During the fourteen-year negotiation, GATT/WTO parties and China have
discussed a number of crucial issues that substantially impact on Chinese
protective trade regime and policy.  They include:
       (a) the issues about China’s economic and trade system, covering planned
economic system, planned price system and dual price system, foreign
exchange control and dual exchange rates system, trading rights and trade
monopoly, state-owned enterprise reform, export subsidies;
       (b) the issues of policy uniformity and transparency, such as trade
mandatory plan, import quota and licensing requirements, preferential policies
of Special Economic Zones, regional and industrial policies, custom regulations
and standards, and information availability of laws, regulations, and data;
       (c) the issue of China’s accession to GATT/WTO as a developing or
developed country;
       (d) the issues on foreign companies’ market access to China, including
tariffs reduction and binding, import quota and license, import substitution
directive, industrial policy, restrictions in agriculture and service, intellectual
property rights protection, national treatment of investment, and GATT/WTO
plural agreements; and
       (e) the issues of China’s market disruption in world market, ranging from
selective safeguard clause and GATT/WTO mutual non-applicable clause to
antidumping, countervailing duty, and quantitative restriction of China’s exports.
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       Indeed, both China and main WTO contracting parties would be losers if
they denied China’s accession to WTO as a developing country. The GTAP
model simulation shows that China’s real GDP, welfare, and trade will decrease
dramatically in 2005 compared to those of the base year 1992, much due to the
restrictive export quotas imposed on textiles.  For U.S. and EU countries, they
cannot benefit from China’s huge and growing home market, which will
accordingly lose many employment opportunities, and consumers have to pay
higher cost for the imports of labour-intensive goods.  Their term of trade will
also deteriorate (Yang, 1996).
        Regionalism: China and APEC
        Basically, APEC, NAFTA and EU are three largest markets for China’s
exports and imports.  In particular, China has intended to prefer more to briskly
involving into all-dimensional economic coopeartion in the Asia-Pacific region.
It is not only because China has meaningfully commercial stakes in the dymanic
Asia-Pacific region, but also because APEC provides China with an accessible
track of implementing her regional trade strategy to ferment a favourable
surrounding for the sake of domestic reforms.
        First and foremost, exports to and imports from Asia-Pacific countries
account for more than half of China's total trade, because her main trade
partners all dwell in the region. Hence, the meaningful commercial interest of
market access to and dependence on technology-intensive imports from Asia-
Pacific countries get China spurred to anchor her trade policy in APEC, the only
regional economic cooperation organization in which she participates now.
Second, APEC seems be an efficient diplomatic vehicle for China in pursuit of
her responsibility in the globe as a shepherd for developing countries and this
motive is far beyond the trade liberalization and facilitation.  Third, APEC
already has evolved into a substantial geo-political dialogue platform, where
Chinese leaders are able to have routine meetings with those of other nations.
Fourth, APEC is very likely to be a sub-optimal means substituting for long
denied  accession to GATT/WTO.  It offers China a midway approach for fully
integration into the world trade system.  China can also discuss a number of
essential bilateral trade issues in the APEC arena.  She will be faced with fewer
aggressive external pressures from other members than contracting parties in
WTO.   In short, China has little to lose and much to gain in APEC.
       China has a very clear and confirmed vision for APEC that it should keep to
its nature as an economic forum and focus on promoting the regional economic
cooperation.  In other words, the function of APEC is only a consultative and
consensual decision-making entity, and it is neither a venue for trade
negotiation and bargaining, nor an obligatory agreement which relies on the
drafting and ratification by all participants of legally binding international
agreements or treaties.  In essence, APEC is a loosely-structured and
minimized-institutional organization.  The willingness for China's regional
cooperation with others doesn't have any hint of transfering sovereignty,
deepening far-reaching integration and pursuing extensive institutionalization.
       China's vision of APEC leads to her gradually developed strategy toward it.
Firstly, China attaches great importance to the unique way of collaboration,
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which is so-called "APEC approach" and defends it at any rate to be the
"cornerstone" and "right" direction for the organization. The main elements of
the approach include: (i) adherence to mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit;
(ii) recognition of diversity; (iii) flexibility and pragmatism; (iv) gradual progress
and openness; (v) consensus; and (vi)unilaterism and voluntarity. Secondly,
China is opposed to having an inward-look, fortress-liked and beggar-thy-
neighour organization in the Asia-Pacific and endorses the notion of "open
regionalism" that APEC should be oriented to their own region as well as the
rest of the world.
       During the past decade, China has done the utmost to devote herself to
APEC trade liberalization by initiatives and contributions.  For instance, she has
considerably and successively reduced trade and investment barriers on the
voluntary and piecemeal basis.  In 1995, her "down payment" in the Osaka
Summit presented a meaningful demonstration for the following Manila Action
Plan of APEC (MAPA) ––– reduction of average tariff rate from 40% to 23%,
which was great welcomed and praised by other members.  However, she also
cautiously kept the balance of the concessions between APEC and
GATT/WTO.
       It is undoubted that to a significant degree, the eventual direction that
APEC takes will be influenced by the leadership exercised or not exercised by
the developed members, particularly the United States. With the increasing
intention to the Asia-Pacific Rim, the U.S. foreign policy to APEC will have more
conflicts with and squeeze on China, since both parties hold different vision and
strategy to the commonly-interested region.
      For the United States, APEC is not an end in itself but a means to achieve a
series of foreign policy goals, incorporating U.S. economic, political, and
security interests.  They are reflected in President Clinton's proposed "New
Asia-Pacific Community".  U.S. politicians never give up their dream to attain
such an established goal, albeit setback and boycott by its partners in Asia.
       APEC has special meanings for U. S. trade policy.  Firstly, APEC turns to
be a tool for the U.S. seeking to "ratchet up" multilateral trade, catalyze world-
wide trade liberalization, and facilitate future negotiations.  It can be shown by
three specific American accomplishments in APEC, namely, to finish and
accelerate the Uruguay Round, to launch the new Millennium round of world
trade negotiation, and to stimulate multilateral sector negotiations on
liberalization of information technology products and services (e.g.
telecommunication).  Secondly, APEC can offer the U.S. an experimental yard
to seek regional agreement on proposals which have been considered in the
GATT/WTO but can not yet be adopted there.  The notable examples in this
regard are trade facilitation programs, competition policy, deregulation, public
procurement, and market access to some service sectors.  Finally, for the U.S.,
APEC is a short-cut for market penetration because her three largest trading
partners, half of the ten vital Big Emerging Markets she identified, and two
largest trade partners she has trade deficit with are all APEC members.  By and
large, in American perspective, regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, is
complementary to her ultimate goal of trade multilateralism.
     With the ideology of New Asia-Pacific Community and mission of trade
policy, the primary strategy of the U.S. to APEC has been to institutionalize
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APEC to be a free trade area on an evolutionary basis. In addition, the U.S. is
making efforts to push forward the modality, formality and comparability of
APEC trade liberalization programs. The U. S. governemnt also tried to propose
the methods of ”APEC-plus”, ”flexible concensus”, and ”critical math” to ratchet
up those members whom she considers as ”pulling the leg” in APEC.   By all
means, the U.S. needs APEC evolve to be an organisational maturity to serve
her broader goal of free trade.  The second strategy is that trade and
investment liberalization and facilitation have been the priority goals for the U.S.
since APEC was founded.  Contrary to slow, flexible and unilateral way of some
developing members, the U.S. pointed out that implementing the trade
liberalization elements of the agenda successfully will require close adherence
to three guiding concepts called the "three C's" ––– comprehensiveness,
comparability, and consultation, which can be seen as a typical step for the U.S.
to strive APEC to be a rule-based and formalized community.  Thirdly, U.S.
perennially stresses the importance of reciprocal trade concessions and has
rejected accepting the notion that APEC liberalization must rest solely on
unconditional MFN basis, worrying that that unconditional extension would not
only give other countries a free ride on American concessions but also provides
insufficient incentives for non-members to undertake comparable liberalization
measures.
      In short, China has shown her great intention and energy to favour
regionlism in the Asia-Pacific in the wake of economic globalization and holds
the vision and strategy of APEC beyond the trade liberalization. The motive and
approach she has pursued in APEC, however, are still undergoing evolutionary
change and will be challenged by other superpowers in the region. More
importantly, the paper argues that the Chinese future policy towards APEC will
great rely on the political leaders’ ideology of understanding the true nature of
regional cooperation in diplomacy.
       Bilateralism: Sino-U.S. Trade Relation
       Trade issue is one of core disputes in Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship. The
trade disputes cover a number of areas, mainly including  issues on China’s
accession to WTO, Normal Trade Relations (formerly called MFN status) with
China, U.S. large trade deficit with China, Chinese export subsidies, Chinese
prisoner products export, China’s satellite launching business, market access of
key agricultural, industrial and service products to China, intellectural property
right protection in China, U.S. export control of high-tech products to China,
U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty to Chinese exports, and China’s
textiles export quotas and "illegal" transhipment.  Apparently, the bilateral trade
negotiation had a significant impact on trade policy decision-making of Chinese
authority.  During past decades, the most essential achievement of bilateral
trade talks are China-U.S. Memorandum of Market Access (1992) and China-
U.S. Bilateral WTO Agreement (1999).  Meanwhile, intensive trade frictions and
nearly-occurred trade wars broke out due to the disputes on market access and
intellectural property rights protection in 1991, 1994 and 1995. To a great
extent, they accelerated the process of China's opening domestic market and
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establishing a functioning system to protect intellectual property rights, which
has become part of China’s nation-wide campaign to combat piracy.
       For China, the trade policy to U.S. anchors in the fundamental diplomacy
so-called  “constructive strategic partnership” with U.S. since American market
is of great importance to China in terms of labour-intensive product exports,
technology imports, and investment financing.  China also tries to tactically seek
the balance between trade issues and other hot disputes with U.S., say, human
rights, Taiwan independence, Tibet autonomy, and nuclear proliferation.
       The basic American trade policy towards China is part of Clinton
Administration’s strategy of “comprehensive engagement” with China.  It will
serve U.S. government to creat a peaceful, stable and prosperous Asia-Pacific
region,  promote political and economic liberalization within China, integrate
China into the global rules-based trading system, and pursue U.S. commercial
interests. In particualr, a sound trade agreement will open Chinese markets to
U.S. exports, and give American domestic industries stronger protection against
"unfair" trade practices because China is now the fourth largest American trade
partner.  Hence, to win these benefits, a bilateral agreement with China must be
commercially meaningful, addressing American major concerns in a detailed,
enforceable and rapid way.  In return, U.S. will offer China the permanent
Normal Trade Relation status and support her endeavour to join the WTO.
       The U.S. trade policy towards China strongly roots in her long evolved
trade philosophy of “new reciprocity” (overall reciprocity) and trade strategy of
“stick-and-carrot”. The U.S. government paid great attention to countries with
larger bilateral trade surplus with U.S., to those with larger and faster-growing
economies, and to those she thought with higher trade barriers.  These patterns
of behavior do not appear to vary by presitential administration. To American
trade officials, all kinds of "lateralism", whether they be multi, uni, bi, tri or
plurilateral, are good as long as foreign trade barriers can be reduced.
       The policy is also influened by the political policy-making procedure and
structure in America and demands of a variety of domestic special interest
groups. For example, the bipartisan struggle often gives an inconsistent trade
policy to China. The executive administration is likely to be pro China in trade
issues while the Capitol always plays a role of stumbling stone. The U.S. Trade
Representative Office seems to be more aggressives to China than other
administrative bodies.  More importantly, exporters, primarily composed of
agricultural producers, industrial multinational corporations, and key service
suppliers are actively lobbying for reaching and passing a bilateral trade
agreement with China, while import competing sectors, Union, and human right
activists are opposed it. As a consequence, U.S. trade policy to China is
probably best considered as a manifestation of competing interests in which no
single goal predominates, and special interest groups may only hold sway on
particular issues.
III.  Model
        There are few formal models to describe the political economy of China's
trade policy in the literature.  Branstetter and Feenstra (1999) derived a model
drawing on Grossman and Helpman (1994) with the feature of empirically
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estimable government objective function and they viewed the political process
of trade liberalization in China as trading off the social benefits of increased
trade and foreign direct investment against the losses incurred by state-owned
enterprises.  However, due to the nature of trade policy that is exclusively made
by the central government, it seems unrealistic for the model to be theoretically
developed and empirically test on the cross-region basis, albeit the limited
economic integration among Chinese provinces which they argued.
        Instead, in this part, I attempts to formulate a formal model of the political
economy of trade protection, which is fit to Chinese political system, in order to
depict the decision-making process of trade policy mainly from the supply side.
The specific-factor model and government objective function in the particular
form are core of the new model.  More importantly, contrary to the study of
Branstetter and Feenstra, the model is developed and can also be applied to
empirical study on the cross-industry basis that looks more reliable in practice.
       Commodity market and factor market are supposed to be in perfect
competition structure and infinite supply elasticity is for production factors. The
international price is considered as exogenous. Like other models, the “free
rider” problem of interest groups' lobbying is ignored.  Finally, trade policy is
only available policy vehicle for the government and there are no differnces
between tariff and non-tariff barriers.  According to Renaud (1989), the structure
of political economy model should include following elements:
      (a) parties in the decision-making process;
      (b) the interest function of parties;
      (c) the parties’ influence on policy makers;
      (d) policy tools;
      (e) binding institutional constraints for parties; and
      (f)  the equilibrium solution of policy.
      In the demand side, all labours (in the number of L) in the economy will
participate in the policy-making process.  Each preference is supposed to be
homogenous and the quasi-linear utility fucntion of representative individual is:
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In the supply side, following the assumption proposed by Grossman and
Helpman (1994), I suppose that only labour is needed for producing the
numerate good 0 and both input-output coefficient and wage rate (w) are one.
To produce non-numerate goods requires labour and at least one specific
factor.  On the assumption of free labour mobility among sectors, their wage
rate is also one. The return  of specific factor, p i , depends on the price of
commodity i, p
i
, so that )( p
iii pp = .  According to the Hotelling Theorem, we
know that the production function of good i )(')( ppy
iiii p= .
Foreign trade results from the gap between domestic demand and supply
so that the net import yLDM iii -=  and net tariff revenue is
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       Suppose that tariff revenue will be distributed equally to each labour by
means of government income transfer.  Hence, an individual’s total income is
composed of three parts ––– labour wage, return of specific factors, and
transfer of tariff revenue.
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       Here si  represents an individual’s share in the total specific return for
producing good i and 1
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jis , i=1, 2, …, n.  With [4] and indirect utility function
V(p, I)=I+S(p), the individual's interest function, which includes supplier surplus
and consumer surplus, can be written as
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The individual’s objective is to maximize his interest function.
       Next, we turn to consider another crucial and special policy maker ––– the
central government.  Its interest function G can be obtained as [6] by weightedly
summing up returns of all individuals.
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       In other words, G is regarded as the social welfare function for the authority
and the objective of the government is to maximize it.  Two parameters in [6],
namely b  and q i , are particularly noteworthy here.  b  represents the weight of
factor incomes to the sum of net tariff transfer and consumer surplus. Generally
speaking, b ³1, which indicates that the government usually pay more attention
to the interest of producers than consumers.  The reason is due to either
governmental short-term policy targets on tax revenue, economic growth, etc.,
or the “free rider” problem of consumers’ lobbying.  b  also depends on the
distribution of specific factors among all labours.  Specifically, the more even
the distrbution is, the more b  tends to 1.  We mark all exogenous variables
influencing b as w  and so )(wbb = .       
49
The parameter q i shows weights that the government endows to different
sectors in the objective function. In general, q i ³1.  From the perspective of
political supply, it implies that the government prefers to favour some “strategic”
sectors based on its ideology and deliberated targets, or from the perspective of
political demand,  it shows sectoral distinctive lobbying capability which is close
related to the industrial characteristic.  Similarly, we mark all exogenous
variables that influence q i as  zi  and therefore )(ziii qq = .        
       Finally, we assume that tariff or non-tariff barriers (of tariff equivalence) are
only policy instrument available to the central government.  Several propositions
and deductions are then attained as follows.  Regretably, all proof procedures
are omitted due to the fomat of short paper.
Proposition 1.  To maximize the government’s objective function, the
optimal protection rate should be
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 M' is the slope of import demand function.
Deduction 1.  When 1=qb i , particularly, b =q i =1, the government will
pursue free trade policy.
Proposition 2.   The magnitude between the individual’s expected optimal
protection rate t i
~ and governmental optimal rate t iˆ relies on the discrepancy
between  b q i and Lsi .  That is
(1) if b q i < Lsi , t iˆ < t i~ ;
(2) if b q i > Lsi , t iˆ > t i~ ; and
(3) if b q i = Lsi , t iˆ = t i~ .
       Deduction 2.   When specific factors are equally distributed among the
labours in sector i, free trade policy will prevail in the sector.
Proposition 3.  The more  parameter b  (the weight of factor incomes to
the sum of tariff revenue transfer and consumer surplus) or q i  (the weight
endowed to different sectors) is, the higher optimal tariff rate t iˆ  will be.  That is
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Proposition  4.  Subject to the binding condition of (1) ti £ *ti  (binding tariff
requirement) or (2) tM ii d- ³ xiLm * (minimum import requirement), the new
optimal protection rate will turn to be (1) *},min{ ˆ ttt iii =& or (2)
)}*(
1
,ˆmin{ xLmMtt iiii -= d
& , where *ti  is exogenous binding tariff rate
and M ,d , and *m  represent autonomous net import, sensitivity coefficient of
net import to tariff change, and exogenous minimium ratio of import to domestic
consumption respectively.
       Proposition  5.   When the government has a trade talk (cooperatively)
with a foreign country (*), as long as the negotiating procedure allows both
sides to choose from the outcomes that are efficient from their own perspective,
the equilibrium can be obtained to satisfy:
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where I is a dummy symbolizing that the industry i is represented by a lobby, aL
is the share of population that owns specific factors, and a  represents the
foreign government’s weight of welfare relative to political contribution in its
governmental objective function (Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
The revised model in the paper can explain the trade policy formation in the
country with political characteristic of democratic-centralism.  The individual
utility function and income function reflect democratic participation of all labours,
while the governmental objective function, distinguished from that in western
countries, reveals the central government’s preference on welfare distribution
( b ) and industrial strategy (q i )  in terms of “activism" and "nationalism”.  The
political pressure of interest groups is still “marginal” and lobbying or rent-
seeking activities are rather implicit.  It is reflected by the parameter q i in the
model.  The proposition extended to include exogenous binding conditions and
cooperative trade talk will further fit to China’s current situations in multilateral,
regional, and bilateral trade negotiations.  Significantly, the political equilibria of
tariff formula in the model, namely Proposition 1, coincides with the unified
framework that is proposed by Helpman (1995) to compare different political
economy approaches explaining trade policy.  However, the model still needs
being modified and extended by considering lobbying cost, free rider problem,
sequential game between interest groups and the central government, and
feedback to external bids.
IV.     The Empirical Study of Political Economy of Industrial
          Protection Pattern in China
        Dependent Variables
        In lack of enough price comparision data, only “single index” method is
used to estimate trade protection rates in China, including nominal tariff rate,
frequency ratio of non-tariff barriers, and effective protection rate.  They will be
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dependent variables for the following empirical models.  Techincal notes of
three protection rates can be found in Appendix.
       Tariffs
       Although the simple average tariff rate lowers from 43% in 1992 to 18% in
1998 and the weighted average tariff rate is reduced from 41% to 19% during
the same period (Table 1), there still exits great dispersion among tariff lines,
which indicates the implicit trade distortion in China.  In 1998, the deviation
coefficient of tariffs for all products, primary products and manufactured
products are 74%, 104% and 62% respectively.  For industrial goods1, nominal
tariff rates of 36 sectors in China are listed in Table 9.  The deviation coefficient
of them are 72%, 80%, and 70% in 1992, 1994 and 1996 respectively.
       There is significant discrepancy between nominal tariff rate and tariff
collected rate because of complex and arbitrary tariff exemption system. For
example, the nominal tariff rate in 1997 is 18% while the collected tariff rate is
only 3%.  However, tariff collected rates for industrial sectors are unavailable
due to limited information.  Finally, as Table 9 shows, tariff reductions in lines
are gradual and piecemeal, varying on the arbitrary basis.
        Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
        The “frequency ratio”, the ratio of the number of tariff lines subject to one
or more than one NTBs to the total number in the category, is used to represent
the restrictiveness of NTBs.  In addition, NTBs are estimated by two methods of
measures, namely “hard core” (only import quota and license) and “all”
instruments.  Table 10 shows that the average frequency ratio lowers from 37%
in 1994 to 31% in 1996 for “all” NTBs and from 10% to 5% for “hard core” NTBs
during the same period.  Some imports, say, beverage, tobacco, chemical
fabrics, and transportation equipment, are usually restricted by higher NTBs,
quantitative measures in particular, than others.  The third feature of NTBs,
shown by the Pearson test, is that they are complementary to tariff protection.
Particularly there exists the strong positive correlation (0.55) between tariffs and
quantitive restriction measures.
        Effective protection rate (EPR)
        EPR is calculated by value added in Balassa approach (1971) in order to
consider the effect of intermediate goods to reflect the overall degree to which
economic resource is distortedly allocated.  As shown in Table 11,  EPRs of 36
Chinese industrial sectors are much higher and more disperse than nominal
tariff rates.  Tariff escalation generally has raw material and intermediate
product sectors negatively protected while overwhelmingly stimulates down-
stream production of consumer goods and capital goods.  The average of EPR
drops significantly from 81% in 1992 to 45% in 1996, but the deviation
coefficient keeps almost unchanged to be around 100%.  Moreover, the fact
that nominal tariff rate and EPR are highly correlated in the time series shows
                                                                
1 Industrial products include all manufactured products and some primary products.
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that the government can implement the plan of resource allocation in the
economy  through the prevailing tariff regime1.
Table 9.    Nominal Tariff Rates by China’s Industrial Sectors (%)
1992 1994 1996
01 Mining of coal 18.1 14.3 5.5
02 Extraction of crude oil and natural gas 20.6 16.9 7.8
03 Mining of ferrous  metals 0.0 0.0 0.0
04 Mining of non-ferrous metals 6.5 4.1 2.6
05 Mining of non-metallic minerals       30.3       26.3         7.8
06 Logging and related activities       12.5         7.5         4.4
07 Food products 49.5 44.3 36.9
08 Beverage 103.7 100.0 57.9
09 Tobacco 150.0 145.0 70.0
10 Textiles 71.3 57.5 31.0
11 Apparel and other fabric articles 88.4 75.4 41.9
12 Leather and feather products 72.4 55.2 42.3
13 Wood products 41.6 22.4 19.8
14 Funiture 75.7 66.1 44.4
15 Paper and paper products 35.4 27.7 22.3
16 Printing and publishing 16.0 12.0 10.2
17 Stationery,sports and entertainment goods 56.3 47.8 39.0
18 Petroleum refineries  and coking 16.5 13.4 8.1
19 Basic industrial chemicals 27.2 23.2 14.3
20 Drugs and medicines 22.3 18.1 11.2
21 Chemical synthetics and fabrics 78.3 61.8 33.1
22 Plastic products 36.9 30.7 21.3
23 Rubber products 42.3 35.5 24.9
24 Non-metallic manufactures 49.8 40.5 25.8
25 Iron and steel 13.9 13.5 9.0
26 Non-ferrous manufactures 16.9 15.0 9.8
27 Metal products 39.6 34.0 18.9
28 General machinery 31.2 25.2 16.5
29 Specialized machinery 21.2 19.4 14.6
30 Transport equipment 67.6 64.4 35.7
31 Electric machinery and apparatus 40.0 30.1 21.1
32 Electronic and communication equipment 43.5 34.8 22.8
33 Scientific instruments and office equipment 40.9 31.2 23.5
34 Other manufacturing not else classified 56.5 49.3 31.5
35 Electricity, heating and water 3.0 3.0 3.0
36 Coal gas 15.0 12.0 6.0
   Mean 43.7 36.5 23.3
   Standard deviation 31.3 29.3 16.3
   Deviation coefficient 71.6 80.3 70.0
    Source: Author’s calculation
                                                                
1 The Pearson test shows the correlation is as high as 0.92 in the sample years.
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Table 10.    Frequency Ratios of Non-tariff Barriers by  China’s Industrial Sectors (%)
1994 1996
Quota &
license
all Quota &
license
all
01 Mining of coal 0.0 62.5 0.0 50.0
02 Extraction of crude oil and natural gas 7.7 7.7 0.0 7.1
03 Mining of ferrous  metals 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
04 Mining of non-ferrous metals 0.0 10.7 0.0 7.1
05 Mining of non-metallic minerals 11.0 36.3 0.0 11.4
06 Logging and related activities 60.9 69.6 0.0 95.0
07 Food products 4.0 93.6 4.8 96.5
08 Beverage 43.3 86.7 40.0 90.0
09 Tobacco 83.3 83.3 33.3 66.7
10 Textiles 1.9 36.6 0.7 8.4
11 Apparel and other fabric articles 11.2 11.2 0.0 11.3
12 Leather and feather products 0.0 25.9 0.0 7.4
13 Wood products 18.1 33.7 0.0 82.2
14 Funiture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15 Paper and paper products 8.3 67.4 0.0 39.7
16 Printing and publishing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
17 Stationery,sports and entertainment goods 0.0 10.3 0.0 12.4
18 Petroleum refineries  and coking 17.1 28.6 20.0 28.6
19 Basic industrial chemicals 9.1 18.2 5.7 15.1
20 Drugs and medicines 0.0 79.1 0.0 76.2
21 Chemical synthetics and fabrics 88.1 92.7 30.2 93.2
22 Plastic products 12.1 31.0 10.9 12.5
23 Rubber products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
24 Non-metallic manufactures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
25 Iron and steel 1.4 82.2 0.0 85.9
26 Non-ferrous manufactures 0.7 48.6 0.0 45.3
27 Metal products 0.0 18.6 0.0 15.6
28 General machinery 8.9 39.1 7.3 34.3
29 Specialized machinery 2.5 30.2 0.3 36.3
30 Transport equipment 33.3 41.9 27.7 32.8
31 Electric machinery and apparatus 3.5 21.2 2.2 17.5
32 Electronic and communication equipment 22.1 40.7 13.8 25.1
33 Scientific instruments and office equipment 10.9 22.3 4.8 9.2
34 Other manufacturing not else classified 0.0 0.7 0.0 3.5
35 Electricity, heating and water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
36 Coal gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Mean 10.1 36.5 5.3 30.6
   Source: Author’s calculation
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Table 11.    Effective Protection Rates by China’s Industrial Sectors (%)
1992 1994 1996
01 Mining of coal 13.7 9.5 -2.1
02 Extraction of crude oil and natural gas 19.6 15.7 5.1
03 Mining of ferrous  metals -26.0 -22.2 -14.2
04 Mining of non-ferrous metals -8.5 -10.2 -6.5
05 Mining of non-metallic minerals 36.2 32.6 -0.2
06 Logging and related activities 6.1 -0.4 -0.6
07 Food products 176.2 161.0 143.1
08 Beverage 256.8 252.7 139.3
09 Tobacoo 219.4 214.6 100.0
10 Textiles 157.9 126.3 63.5
11 Apparel and other fabric articles 220.2 196.0 109.2
12 Leather and feather products 197.4 142.4 121.4
13 Wood products 58.9 8.5 26.7
14 Funiture 204.8 190.1 128.3
15 Paper and paper products 67.3 50.6 46.7
16 Printing and publishing -6.9 -8.2 -2.5
17 Stationery,sports and entertainment goods 107.7 94.7 96.4
18 Petroleum refineries  and coking 53.9 43.7 26.9
19 Basic industrial chemicals 38.1 32.5 19.7
20 Drugs and medicines 18.4 12.9 6.4
21 Chemical synthetics and fabrics 174.1 135.4 69.6
22 Plastic products 38.4 31.0 30.0
23 Rubber products 90.6 76.2 59.5
24 Non-metallic manufactures 97.7 78.4 50.5
25 Iron and steel 13.0 15.5 11.4
26 Non-ferrous manufactures 27.3 26.1 17.4
27 Metal products 103.5 87.6 44.8
28 General machinery 53.3 41.4 27.2
29 Specialized machinery 17.5 20.0 19.5
30 Transport equipment 151.8 149.7 79.5
31 Electric machinery and apparatus 87.2 60.3 44.0
32 Electronic and communication equipment 80.4 63.8 41.6
33 Scientific instruments and office equipment 64.9 47.0 39.1
34 Other manufacturing not else classified 118.9 105.8 71.0
35 Electricity, heating and water -12.9 -9.4 -2.6
36 Coal gas -0.7 -2.8 -3.5
   Mean 81.0 68.6 44.6
   Standard deviation 77.5 71.6 45.0
   Deviation coefficient 104.5 0.96 0.99
    Source: Author’s calculation
        High and stable dispersion of different protection rates arouses an
essential question concerning the political economy of trade policy in China–––
what kinds of political and economic factors determine such a diversified
industrial protection pattern and trade liberalization packages?  Based on the
revised theoretical model, the study attempts to find out a number of plausible
independent variables (vectors of w  and zi ) that have an impact on two key
parameters ––– b  and q i , which then further influence trade protection rates.
Therefore, cross-sectoral trade protection rates can be estimated by the
following the reduced-form econometric model:
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       Four empirical models are proposed as follows in hypothesis to explain the
determinants of trade protection rates in the Chinese industry.  For each model,
the basic idea, independent variables, expected signs and economic
explanation will be specified.
       Regression Models
       National Interest Model
       In this model, trade policy is regarded as a public good to serve for the
national or social interests, which have often been described in the “social
concern approach”.  There are two plausible national interests for the Chinese
central government.  One is to fulfil so-called “national strategy”, including
industrial policy to foster the development of pillar sectors, open-door policy to
promote international competitiveness, and policy to maintain economic security
and balance of payment.  Another one could be to pursue income redistribution
among labours and other related targets, for example, achieving social equity,
reducing structural adjustment cost, alleviating proverty, and safeguarding the
interest of low-income workers.  Independent variables for two sub-models are
listed in  Table 12 and 13.
Table 12.   National Interest Model: Sub-model A ––– National Strategy
Variables Definition Expected
Sign
Explanation
Value added ratio The ratio of value added
to gross value
+ Encouraged by industrial policy
Labour productivity The ratio of value added
to employee number
+ Encouraged by industrial policy
Backward  linkage
coefficient
See Appendix + Trade development strategy of export
promotion; Supply-induced effect
Forward linkage
coefficient
See Appendix - Trade development strategy of import
substitution; Demand-induced effect
Competitiveness
indicator
The ratio of net export to
the sum of export and
import
- Normally, lower protection for high
competitive sectors;
Intra-industry trade theory
Concentration of
foreign exchanges
The ratio of sectoral
import to  total import
+? Maintaining balance of payment;
Scarcity of foreign exchanges
Dummy variable 1 for key sectors
specified in official
documents, 0 for others
+ Encouraged by industrial policy
Non-tariff barriers Frequency ratios Uncertain
       Interest Group Rent-seeking Model
       The model hypothesizes that trade policy is a political product demanded
by various kinds of interest groups and the government is ready to respond it by
sale of protection.  But other interest groups who are negatively affected by the
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policy will be opposed to it by similar sort of lobbying.  Finally, there comes to
an political equilibrium among interest groups. The model is frequently called
"self-interest approach" in the literature.  Independent variables of the model are
listed in  Table 14.
Table 13.  National Interest Model: Sub-model B ––– Income Distribution
Variables Definition Expected
Sign
Explanation
The share of low-
income workers
The ratio of low-income
workers to all employees
+
The share of low-skilled
workers
The ratio of low-skilled workers
to all employees
+
The share of workers
over 50 years old
The ratio of workers over 50
ages to all employers
+
The share of low-
educated workers
The ratio of workers without
higher education to all
employees
+
Average annual income The ratio of total annual salary
income to the employee
number
-
The share of sectoral
employment
The ratio of the  workers in a
sector to all employees
+
Achieving social equity;
Reducing structural
adjustment cost;
Alleviating proverty;
Safeguarding the interest of
low-income workers
Table 14.     Interest Group Rent-seeking Model
Variables Definition Expected
Sign
Explanation
The number of
companies
The total number of
companies or enterprises with
independent accountability
uncertain Index for seller concentration; positive
sign in the adding machine model
(Caves, 1976), but negative sign in
the pressure group model (Olson,
1965; Pincus, 1975)
Export ratio The ratio of export to gross
output
- Lener Theorem; Pass-through
Coefficient Theory
Import
penetration ratio
The ratio of import to domestic
consumption
+? Normally higher protection for import
shock; Exceptional case in Grossman
and Helpman's model (1994)
Capital intensive
ratio
The ratio of fixed capital
(excluding depreciation) to the
number of employees
- Index for the force of Union;
Higher marginal revenue of capital,
specific factor dedicated to lobbying
Tax and profit The annual tax and profit
revenue submitted to the
government
+  Fiscal policy and public finance
The share of
state-owned
enterprises
The ratio of value added of
state-owned enterprises to
sectoral gross value added
+ Ideological preference;
Bad performance;
Vulnerable competitiveness
Sino-foreign
equity ratio
The ratio of Chinese registered
capital to foreign investment
+ Indicator for the role of  foreign-
funded enterprises; Olarreaga (1998)
Geographic
concentration
See Appendix uncertain Index for local governments; Positive
sign in Picus (1975), but negative in
Caves (1976)
Consumption
ratio
The ratio of resident and social
consumption to total output
- Index for consumers; Collective action
dilemma for consumers' lobbying;
Strong opposition by intermediate
product users
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       Hybrid Model
       The model will combine all independent variables in national interest model
and interest group rent-seeking model in the regression to examine the
significance and stability of determinants in both short and long run.
 Trade Liberalization Model
       The model attempts to study guidelines of China’s cross-industry tariff
reduction schedule in GATT/WTO, APEC and Sino-US trade negotiations.
Besides the independent variables listed above, basic tariffs (1992), historical
tariffs (previous year), and frequency ratio of NTBs are also considered in the
regression.  The relation between tariff reduction rates and historical tariffs are
expected to be positive because foreign governments have long been exerting
great pressure on the Chinese authority to dramatically cut her high tariff peaks.
      Technique and Data
      The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method is used for regressions whose
econometric function is in the general linear form as
                                          maa iki
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where TPR represents dependent variables (nominal tariff rate, frequency ratio
of NTBs, effective protection rate, or tariff reduction rate), PV is an independent
variable vector including political and economic indicators of industrial sectors,
ao  and a k are intercept and regression coefficient respectively.  mi symbolizes
the residual.  Subscript i and k represent different sector and independent
variable.
       To estimate empirical models, data of three years (1992, 1994, 1996) are
collected from various Chinese official source and international organizations
and aggregated up to 36 industrial sectors according to the Chinese Industrial
Classification Standard. The descriptions of data source and technical
explanation are illustrated in the Appendix.
        The estimation on the national interest model, interest group rent-seeking
model, and trade liberalization model are based on annual cross-sector
samples.  For the hybrid model, the methodology of “pooling data”, which
merges the data of cross-sector and time series together, is also used to study
the long-term effect, besides annual estimates likewise.  To avoid the problem
of multilinearity and freedom degree in the hybrid model and trade liberalization
model, the “backward method” of OLS is employed to eliminate those
independent variables with low and minimium T-test value successively until all
remained variables have the controlled significant level.  All independent
variables are supposed to be in linear and non-logarithmic form and exogenous
to varoius protection rates.
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       Results
       National interest model
      The empirical test of the national interest model A ––– “national strategy”
shows that the adjusted R2 is relatively high (0.66-0.87) to well explain the
determinant of annual nominal protection rate.  The labour productivity and
backward linkage coefficient have their expected signs and significant level as
well, but their influence fades gradually during the period from 1992 to 1996.
The competitiveness index also hold the significant level, but the sign is
opposite to the expected, which indicates a distinct characteristic of China’s
trade protection regime that those industrial sectors with comparative
advantages are more protected.  “Hard core” NTBs are shown to be
complementary rather than substitute to nominal tariff protection, while the
coefficients of “all” NTBs are not in the significant level.  Other independent
variables have insignificant T-test values, no matter they have expected or
unexpected signs.
       The result of estimate on annual effective protection rate is basically similar
except that the backward linkage coefficient losts its significance and the value
added ratio holds significance but with the unexpected sign. In addition, the
adjusted R2 is lower than that in the above test, dropping to appromixately 0.5,
which implies that there are yet other unspecified political and economic factors
to explain the disperse effective protection rates in the industry.
       The regression result of the national interest model B ––– “income
redistribution”  is surprisingly disappointed. The adjusted R2 of the estimate on
both nominal tariffs and effective protection rates are relatively low (0.4-0.5).
More significantly, only the share of low educated workers has the both
expected sign and significant level.  Though having positive signs, the share of
employment, and the index of Union force or employment pressure, doesn’t
pass through the threshold value of T-test.  The rest of independent variables all
hold unexpected signs.  Therefore, the empirical test shows that China’s trade
policy doesn’t seem to provide the function for redistributing income, reducing
proverty, and promoting social justice.  It is uniquely distinguished from many
studies on western countries where trade protection is very likely to be the
effective policy to reduce structural adjustment cost and safeguard low wage
community.  The possible reasons could be that the nature of Union in China is
substantially different and the authority may prefer to use other direct policy
tools, like income and food subsidy, to achieve such social targets.
       Interest group rent-seeking model
       Primarily, the explanation competence of the empirical test of interest group
rent-seeking model is inferior to that of national strategy model.  As far as
nominal tariffs are concerned, not only is the adjusted R2 relatively low (the
maximum is 0.6), but most of independent variables have an insignificant level.
For nominal protection rate, the significant determinant factors are tax and profit
(expected sign), the share of state-owned enterprises (unexpected sign but in
decreasing trend), and the consumption ratio (expected sign).  The geographic
concentration index shows the positive sign and, however, in an insignificant
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level, probably due to the similar regional industrial structure in China.  Other
variables are neither significant nor signally stable in the annual regression.  In
particular, some variables, like the number of companies, export ratio, and
import penetration ratio, which are usually used in other empirical literatures,
seem invalid to explain the case of China.
       As regards NTBs, F-test is so low that two annual regressions cannot pass
through the critical value. No independent variables with stable significance
level are found except that quantatitive restrictions (hard core NTBs) are
occasionally effected by the geographic concentration index in 1992 and 1994
and consumer ratio in 1996.  It shows that interest groups have little influential
stake on the policy-making of NTBs because the administrative protection is
usually discretionary and autonomously controlled by the executive
bureaucracy.
       For effective protection rates, the result is quite analogous to that of
nominal tariffs.  The consumption ratio appears to be most essential factor to
determine sectoral EPR, which fits well the fact that China’s industrial and trade
policy have long favoured heavily potecting domestic consumer goods
production. The result, however, also shows that the positive coefficient is
reducing gradually in recent years, demonstrating the bold and resolute trade
liberalization reform by the central government.  Tax and profit creating as well
as the share of state-owned enterprises have the significant impact on EPRs in
1992 and 1994, but it is soon lost in the case of 1996.
       Hybrid model
       With the backward methodology in regression, the variables which remain
in all annual estimates with significant T-value on nominal tariffs are labour
productivity, competitiveness index,  tax and profit,  and “hard core” NTBs.  For
the case of effective protection rates, they are labour productivity,
competitiveness index, and consumption ratio. Hence, most of remained
independent variables are those significant in the national strategy model.
Meanwhile, the adjusted R2 for the hybrid model is only slightly higher than that
of national strategy model, showing the marginal effect of interest groups' rent-
seeking.
         When pooling the data to get larger samples, we are able to obtain a
general view of the determination of trade protection pattern in the long term, as
listed in Table 15.   Those sectors which have the characteristics of higher labor
productivity, higher comparative advantage, higher backward linkage, higher
labor intensity, higher profits and tax creating, lower value-added proportion of
public enterprises and higher consumer goods ratio usually obtain higher
nominal and effective protection.  Again, there is a complementary relation
between tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  These conclusions are basically parallel
to the empirical results mentioned above.  Next, the dummy variable of key
sectors appears to be significantly positive to explain EPR. The fact that
coefficients of time dummy variables, though insignificant, decrease in years
indicates the trade liberalization process occurred in China.  Finally, the
adjusted R2 is high for the regression on nominal tariff, but it is relatively lower
for EPR, which leaves further question to study.
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          Table 15.   The Determination of Nominal Tariff Rates and Effective Protection
                            Rates of China’s Industrial Sectors:  “Pooling the Data” Method
Independent variables Nominal protection rate Effective protection rate
Intercept 16.27
(1.13E-07)
-168.07
(-2.99E-07)
Labour productivity 0.0003***
(3.58)
0.0006***
(3.02)
Backward linkage coefficient 26.22*
(1.70)
21.66
(0.36)
Forward linkage coefficient 5.08
(1.55)
6.08
(0.57)
Competitiveness index 11.71***
(4.05)
27.41***
(2.52)
Export ratio 0.07
(1.54)
0.20
(1.19)
Import penetration ratio 0.07
(1.24)
0.28
(1.22)
Capital intensity -0.0001**
(-2.20)
-0.0002
(-0.82)
Tax and profits 0.02
(0.82)
-
The share of state-owned
enterprises
-0.31***
(-3.13)
-0.81**
(-2.15)
Sino-foreign equity ratio 0.002
(0.79)
-0.004
(-0.48)
Consumption ratio 0.35***
(4.15)
1.36***
(4.19)
Hard core NTBs 0.74***
(9.82)
-
Dummy variable
 (Key sector=1)
2.31
(0.71)
25.39**
(2.09)
Dummy variable (1992=1) -9.89
(-6.86E-08)
224.19
(3.99E-07)
Dummy variable (1994=1) -22.32
(-1.55E-07)
197.50
(3.52E-07)
Dummy variable (1996=1) -32.00
(-2.22E-07)
168.00
(2.99E-07)
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.57
F-value 28.68*** 8.86***
Samples 108 108
Note: T-value in parenthesis, *** for 1% significant level, ** for 5% significant level , * for 10% significant
level
Source: Author’s estimation
       Trade liberalization model
       Again, with the backward method, the empirical test shows that in 1994 the
lower reduction in tariffs goes to those sectors with higher competitiveness
index, concentration ratio of foreign exchange, and capital intensity.  It reflects
some traditional principles that the government adheres to when taking trade
reforms ––– maintaining sector comparative advantages, balance of payment,
and import substitution strategy by protection.  Moreover, high NTBs still
remained to strengthen tariff protection, the phenomenon criticized by the World
Bank (1993b) as a redundancy regime.  On the contrary, the trade reform in
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1996 looks rather radical than before, since the tariffs of sectors with the feature
of higher labour productivity and higher share of state-owned enterprises are
notably reduced.  In addition, the historical tariffs of 1994 have a remarkable
positive impact on tariff reduction rates, which indicates increasing external
pressures from main trade partners on trade talks, especially in the negotiation
of China’s accession to WTO.
V.  Conclusions
        The study on the political econmoy of trade policy in China is important
because it helps to understand the decision-making process of the Chinese
government in the new era and particularly to have an insight into protection
structure as well as some major public policy debates, such as auto industrial
policy, aukarty agricultural policy, service deregulation and liberalization, and
China's accession to GATT/WTO.  It is also conductive to broaden case study
of the political economy of trade policy to a missed huge country.   Yet, much
further work is needed in the future to collect information through fieldwork and
interviews and improve the research methodology, model and data.  The main
conclusions drawn from  the paper are:
       (1) Due to the institutional features of market-preserved authoritarianism
and state activism, the party ideology, government preference and national
interests are the most crucial factors influencing the decision-making of trade
policy in China.  Specifically, trade planning, trade flow controlling, export
promotion and import substitution, industrial policy, national economic security
and balance of payment are concrete objectives to be pursued. The protection
policies of trading rights, automatic import registration, automobile production,
grain import and banking service are those typical cases.
       (2)Thanks to the gradual political democratization and fast economic
growth, more diversified social interests become legitimate and active in a
corporatism state, consequently leading to their increasing lobbying and rent-
seeking activities for import protection and export preferential policies.
Bureaucracy in central executive bodies and local governments, favored in a
“clientelism” network culture, appear to be a dominated interest group, while
others, mainly composed of domestic enterprises of various kinds, foreign
investors, military, and consumers, however only have a marginal or diminishing
impact on the decision-making.  Such an argument can be demonstrated by
case studies on, for example, the policies for protecting telecommunication
sector, import quota and licensing requirement, export quota bidding, foreign
exchange retention and multiple exchange rates system, antidumping
enforcement and anti-smuggling campaign.
       (3) With the integration into the world economy, Chinese authority can no
longer make final decisions by neglecting the world trade institutional settings
and international collective actions as before.  The prevailing diplomatic strategy
and trade philosophy of foreign governments as well as commercial interest of
multinational corporations will impose a more significant external pressure on
China to ratchet up her trade liberalization in the context of multilateralism
(GATT/WTO), regionalism (APEC) and bilateralism (mainly with the United
States). On the other hand, in the long run, China will benefit herself from
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bargain-induced trade reform by fully integrating into a market-oriented and
rules-based world economy.
       (4) The trade protection rates (nominal tariff, non-tariff barriers, and
effective protection rate) are not only relatively high but quite dispersed as well
among 36 Chinese industry sectors, which reflects both national strategic
activism and different lobbying capacity of interest groups. The empirical study
indicates that those sectors which have the characteristics of higher labor
productivity, higher comparative advantage, higher backward linkage, higher
labor intensity, higher profits and tax creating, lower value added proportion of
public enterprises, and higher consumer goods ratio are usually able to obtain
higher nominal and effective protection.  Additionally, there is a complementary
relation between tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  The result of regressions shows
that “social concern model” in the literature seems to be more appropriate to
explain China’s trade protection pattern than “self-interest model”.
Nevertheless, the social concern herein primarily deals with implementing
national interests and industrial policy, rather than mitigating structural
adjustment cost and pursuing the equality of income distribution.
       As regards policy implications, the study argues that if trade liberalization
reform could be viable in the future in China, leaders in the party and central
government have to adopt innovative market-oriented trade philosophy and
succeed in dismantling obstructions from some interest groups by restructuring
political bargain and consensus process in policy-making.  Commitments to
internatinal agreements and institutional rules in world trade system can provide
China with a benchmark and “bicycle effect” for pending reforms.
Appendix: Technical Notes on Data
       In order to establish a data bank for the empirical study, the new Chinese
Industrial Standard Classification (CISC), which has been used by China’s
Statistics Yearbook since 1994, is selected as the benchmark for processing
data.  With fine-tuning it covers 36 industrial sectors.  Data on tariffs, non-tariff
barriers, input-output table, exports and imports, and sectoral economic
indicators are collected from various Chinese official sources and international
organizations. Diagram 9 illustrates the concordance of various classification
standards by which the data of different sources are disaggregated.  Notably,
the International Industrial Standard Classification (ISIC) is used as a pivot for
the concordance with trade flow (SITC) and trade barriers (HS).
Diagram 9.     Concordance of Classification Standards
                           International Industrial                                                               Chinese Industrial
                           Standard Classification                                                          Standard Classification
                                       (ISIC)                                                                                     (CISC)
                                         U. N.                                                                          State Statistics Bureau
      International Trade                             Harmonized Tariff                              Chinese Input-output
  Standard Classification                                 System                                          Table Classification
             (SITC)                                                  (HS)
                                                                     World Custom
                U. N.                                                 Council                                       State Statistics Bureau
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      Nominal tariff rates of industrial goods are re-aggregated and calculated on
the basis of four-digit HS tariff lines in Regulation on Import Tariff and Export
Duty of the People’s Republic of China (1992, 1994, 1996).  To compute
effective protection rates, the tariffs of six agricultural sectors are also re-
aggregated and calculated.
      The frequency ratios of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are estimated from
Regulation on Import and Export Measures of the People’s Republic of China
(1992,1994, 1996/97).  NTBs are divided into “hard core” and “all” measures in
the study. The former are quantitive measures, namely, import quotas and
licenses, while the latter further covers automatic import registration, import
tender, import inspection requirement, plant and veterinary import quarantine
standards, food sanitary inspection, and medical inspection certificate.
       The definition of effective protection rate follows Balassa’s (1971)
approach, ignoring the effect of indirect tax rate and non-tradable goods.
According to Fukasaku and Lecomte (1996), input-output coefficients in the
formula are re-adjusted to obtain those in the free trade regime. The direct
consumption matrix (42 sectors ´ 42 sectors) is re-calculated based on the
89´89 basic flow matrix derived from China’s Input-output Table (1992) with
some fine-tunings of the classification criterion.  Forty-two sectors include six
agricultural sectors and 36 industrial sectors.  Service sectors are omitted
because there is almost no tariff levied on service imports in China.
       The export and import data of 36 sectors in 3-digit (SITC 3) are re-
aggregated and calculated on the basis of the United Nations’ COMTRADE
data bank, via the website of the International Trade Centre (http://www.itc.org).
       Some sectoral economic indicators, such as value added ratio, labour
productivity, number of companies, tax and profit, capital intensity, proportion of
state-owned enterprises, are quoted or simply estimated from China’s Statistics
Yearbook in various issues.  The competitiveness index, concentration of
foreign exchanges, export ratio, and import penetration ratio are calculated on
the basis of exports, imports, output data. The formula of geographic
concentration index follows the method proposed by Trefler (1993) and is
computed by the data in China’s Industrial Statistics Yearbook and China’s
Statistics Yearbook in various issues.   The Sino-foreign equity ratio and all data
concerning labour market are calculated from The Third Round General
Industrial Investigation of the People’s Republic of China (1995).  The backward
and forward linkage indexes, and consumption ratio are computed from the
42´42 input-output matrix previously mentioned. Their formulas are defined in
economics of input-output.
       Finally, the dummy variables for key industrial sectors are set based on a
series of official documentation, such as China’s Industrial Policy Outline
(1992), National Industrial Policy Scheme in Nineties (1994 and 1996), and
National Plan of Economic and Social Development (1996).
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